Print this post.HISTORY REVISITED | ALFONSO CASAL
Review of Grover Furr’s “Khrushchev Lied”
Had Furr succeeded in proving that Thomas More’s biography of Richard III was pure invention and that, far from being Shakespeare’s resentful deformed villain, Richard was a kindly and benevolent monarch; or had Furr demonstrated that Tacitus consciously twisted his account of the Julio-Claudians in order to willfully defame the first Roman emperors; had Furr, in short, managed to definitively prove that a major historical source, one on which the interpretation of an entire epoch is often based, was fraudulent, Furr and his book would have been catapulted to the center of scholarly debate. There would have been workshops and symposia; indeed, a special issue of the American Historical Review would have likely been printed, featuring essays arguing pro and con Furr’s findings. Needless to say, that has not been the case, for the simple reason that Furr’s book deals with Soviet history, specifically with the history of the Stalin period; and here different rules apply.
Despite the advance praise for Khrushchev Lied offered by Soviet-era specialists such as Robert Thurston and Lars Lih, one searches in vain for any scholarly journal reviewing the book. Indeed, aside from comments posted on online political blogs, of both Left and Right, it would appear that the historical profession has chosen to ignore Khrushchev Lied. This is the second assumption one could have safely made. Khrushchev Lied directly challenges the anti-communist, Cold War paradigm still dominant in academia [plus the corporate media and wider culture—Eds]. Not only that, Furr manages to demonstrate that one of the essential documents on which that paradigm rests is a tissue of lies. Not only historical interpretations are at risk here, but academic reputations, and entire careers as well. Thus, a conspiracy of silence has descended on a book that merits the widest possible readership and discussion.
“[Despite its importance] one searches in vain for any scholarly journal reviewing the book…”
Again, in and of itself, this is nothing new. Baldly put, any book that presents a positive interpretation of the Stalin period or that disputes the conventional wisdom that the Soviet head of state was a blood-soaked megalomaniac will have a difficult time finding a publisher. This is not to say that there have not been a number of non-paradigmatic studies of the Stain era published. Books by Getty and Kirkpatrick, to cite just two authors, have put a dent in the dominant view of Stalin and his government held in academia. However, there is a question of balance and accessibility. For example, in the years since the collapse of the USSR, there has been a tidal wave of studies of the Stalin years published in Russia. Some of these studies are critical of Soviet policy during that period, others praise those same policies. Interestingly, none of the those supportive of the Stalin regime are translated into English; while a number of Russian works hostile to Stalin or the Soviet experience of the 1930s, ‘40s, and ‘50s have been issued by major American publishers.
Of all the recent reassessments of Soviet history, Grover Furr’s Khrushchev Lied strikes at the very heart of Cold War history, Nikita Khrushchev’s famed “Secret Speech” to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Presented to a closed session of the Party Congress on 25 February, 1956, Khrushchev’s speech, putatively, denounced Stalin’s many “crimes” and lay bare the former Soviet leader’s reign of error and terror. Khrushchev’s denunciations of Stalin caused a crisis in the world communist movement, providing, as it seemed to, an “insider’s” confirmation of all the worst accusations raised by anti-communists for decades. An immediate result of Khrushchev’s efforts was the political isolation of his opponents within the Soviet Communist Party, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, etc., who still upheld Stalin’s legacy. A longer-term consequence was a split within international communism, with those who seemingly defended Stalin, led by Albania and China, breaking with the Soviet Union and those parties worldwide which hewed to the new Soviet line. Furthermore, the “Secret Speech” became a cornerstone of modern history, and the main documentary buttress for anti-Stalin interpretations of Soviet history and politics.
For a system that, wrapped in sanctimony, depends on total lies, truth is the ultimate threat.
Furr set for himself the task of examining each and every one of the accusations Khrushchev leveled at Stalin (and Beria as well) and examining, point by point, their veracity or falsity. The conclusion he came to is evident in the title of the book. Furr divides Khrushchev’s charges into nine general categories, ranging from “Lenin’s Testament” to Stalin’s supposed complicity in the Kirov assassination, to Stalin’s supposed mismanagement of the Soviet war effort in World War II to Stalin’s last years when he, according to Khrushchev, was planning a major purge of his oldest associates and collaborators. In determining his findings, Furr based himself exclusively on primary sources and archival materials, many of which he has scanned and uploaded for public review athttp://chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/research/kl/bibliography.html.
The essence of Furr’s investigation is the claim that not one accusation leveled by Khrushchev against Stalin and Beria is true. Not one. Indeed, Furr becomes the accuser, in turn, and charges Khrushchev with consciously and maliciously warping the truth about Stalin for political gain. Furr provides a mountain of documentation refuting Khrushchev. So much so, that, in fact, this becomes the book’s main shortcoming. Furr is so painstaking and meticulous in marshalling his evidence that the reader is often numbed by the sheer volume of documents, quotes, and citations he provides. This is not a book for the casual reader or for anyone not versed in Soviet history. However, despite its non-reception in professional historical circles, Khrushchev Lied is an essential work of Soviet history. Moreover, it is a work that not merely solidly proves its premise; but one that stands out as a courageous effort to restore historical truth and balance.
Khrushchev Lied is solid in its research, thorough in its method and scope, sound in its judgments and conclusions, and deserving of the highest praise. It is a book every serious student of Soviet history and politics must read and grapple with. It is, in a word, a major contribution to historical science.
Highly recommended.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
4 comments
Brilliant analysis of Khrushchev’s claims
[NOTE: This review appears here and on Amazon.com]
This book is in three parts. In the first part, Furr examines every one of Khrushchev’s 61 allegations in the light of the documentary evidence, mostly primary sources from the former Soviet archives. In the second part Furr discusses some of the conclusions that follow from this study. The third part presents the fuller quotations from the sources.
Furr writes, “According to the Pospelov report, arrests dropped hugely, by over 90% in 1939 and 1940 in comparison to 1937 and 1938. Executions in 1939 and 1940 dropped to far less than 1% of the levels of mass executions in 1937 and 1938. Beria took over as head of the NKVD in December, 1938, so this corresponds precisely with Beria’s period in command. Khrushchev, therefore, knew of this, but omitted it from the `Secret Speech’ and so concealed it from his audience. It was during the Beria years that trials and executions of men convicted of illegal repressions, mass killings, torture, and falsifications took place. Many – certainly more than 100,000 – persons wrongly repressed were released from GULAG camps and prisons. Khrushchev knew, and concealed, this too.”
Furr presents the evidence that Khrushchev’s allegation that Stalin had a breakdown when the Nazis invaded was, as the Medvedevs wrote, `a complete fabrication’.
He also presents the evidence that Khrushchev’s allegation that Stalin was a bad commander was also wrong. Marshals Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Golovanov all testified that Stalin was a very competent military leader.
Marshal Zhukov wrote, “It seems to me that the matter of the defense of the country in its basic, broadest outlines and directions was carried out correctly. During a period of many years, in economic and social terms, everything, or nearly everything, was done that was possible. As for the period from 1939 to the middle of 1941, during that period special efforts that demanded all our strength and resources were made by the people and the party to strengthen our defense.”
Zhukov also wrote of Stalin, “He knew how to find the main link in a strategic situation and, by seizing it, to find the road for opposing the enemy, of successfully carrying out that or another offensive operation. Undoubtedly he was a worthy Supreme Commander … Beside that, in guaranteeing operations, the creation of strategic reserves, in the organizing of the production of military technology and in general in the creation of everything essential for waging war the Supreme Commander, I tell you directly, showed himself to be a superb organizer.”
The dissident Zhores Medvedev wrote, “Stalin’s anti-Semitism, about which one may read in almost all his biographies, was not religious, nor ethnic, nor cultural. It was political, and expressed itself in anti-Zionism, not hatred of Jews.” Furr commented, “in plain language, Medvedev confirmed that Stalin was not anti-Semitic at all, since opposition to Zionism is common among both religious and non-religious Jews, including in Israel itself.”
Medvedev wrote, “We can assume that Stalin called Pravda either on the evening of February 27 or in the morning of February 28 and arranged for the cessation of publication of anti-Jewish materials and of all other articles dealing with the `Doctors’ Plot’ … In the Soviet Union at that time there was only one person who was able, with a single telephone call to the editor of Pravda or to the Department of Agitprop of the CC CPSU to change official policy. Only Stalin could do that …”
Khrushchev claimed of the wartime deportations of Crimean Tartars, Chechens and Ingush, “this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations” and that there were only `hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons’. Bugai and Gonov concluded, “the Soviet government had by and large allocated its priorities correctly, basing those priorities on its right to maintain order behind the front lines, and in the North Caucasus in particular.”
Furr commented, “The military necessity for the deportations was to secure the Red Army’s rear. In each of the cases of the deported nationalities, very large parts of the population were either actively or passively aiding the Germans in rebelling against the Soviet government, and constituted a serious danger to Soviet forces. In addition, the Soviets could not be sure that the German armies would not push eastward again in 1944, as they had done in each of the three previous years.”
Furr observed, “In 1939 there were 218,000 Crimean Tartars. That should mean about 22,000 men of military age – about 10% of the population. In 1941, according to contemporary Soviet figures, 20,000 Crimean Tartar soldiers deserted the Red Army. By 1944 20,000 Crimean Tartar soldiers had joined the Nazi forces and were fighting against the Red Army.”
And, “In 1943 there were about 450,000 Chechens and Ingush in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (CHASSR). This should have meant about 40,000-50,000 men of age for military service. In 1942, at the height of the Nazis’ military successes, 14,576 men were called to military service, of whom 13,560, or 93%, deserted and either hid or joined rebel or bandit groups in the mountains. There was massive collaboration with German forces on the part of the Chechen and Ingush population.”
Furr concluded, “Khrushchev was not trying to `right the ship of communism’. A total trashing of the truth like the `Secret Speech’ is incompatible with Marxism, or with idealistic motives of any kind. Nothing positive, democratic, or liberating can be built on a foundation of falsehood. Instead of reviving a communist movement, and Bolshevik Party, that had strayed from its true course through grievous errors, Khrushchev was killing it off. Khrushchev himself is `revealed’ not as an honest communist but instead as a political leader seeking personal advantage while hiding behind an official persona of idealism and probity, a type familiar in capitalist countries. Taking into account his murder of Beria and the men executed as `Beria’s gang’ in 1953, he seems worse still – a political thug. Khrushchev was guilty in reality of the kinds of crimes he deliberately and falsely accused Stalin of in the `Secret Speech’.”
Furr wrote, “Once convinced that Khrushchev’s speech is little more than a long, carefully-planned and elaborate lie, no student can ever view Soviet history of the Stalin period in the same way again.”
“Stephen Cohen’s Biography of Bukharin:
A Study in the Falsehood of Khrushchev-Era “Revelations”
Grover Furr, in “Blood Lies” (2014), page 21:
“Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘Secret Speech’, the anti-Stalin speeches at the 22nd Party Congress and the ensuing torrent of Khrushchev-orchestrated fabrications became the basis for the avalanche of anti-Stalin books that followed. Notable among them was, for example, Robert Conquest’s tome The Great Terror, which drew heavily upon these Khrushchev-era materials (although Conquest also used, indiscriminately, any and all anti-Stalin works he could find, including many that proceeded Khrushchev’s speech). In an earlier article (http://clogic.eserver.org/2010/Furr.pdf) Vladimir L. Bobriv and I examined the last chapter of Stephen F. Cohen’s book Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (1973), another of the anti-Stalin books based on Khrushchev-era materials. There we showed (a) that Cohen relied entirely upon Khrushchev-era ‘revelations’ in this chapter of Bukharin’s fate between 1930 and 1938; and (b) that every single ‘revelation’ Cohen makes in that long chapter is demonstrably false, thanks to evidence from Soviet archives now available to researchers.”
“The academic field of Soviet history of the Stalin period has been constructed around the more or less uncritical acceptance of, first, Khrushchev-era, and second, of Gorbachev-era and post-Soviet-era lies. These lies cannot be sustained in the face of the evidence now available from former Soviet archives. However, to admit this would entail exposing the fact that the works of dozens of historians of the USSR are poisoned at the root.” (Grover Furr, “Blood Lies”, 2014)