Russia and America, One Hundred Years Face to Face

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=By= Gaither Stewart (rome)

US eagle, Russian Bear

Source: namu wiki

[dropcap]A[/dropcap]s Stephen Lendman reported recently on these pages, Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister and a unique political figure of today’s world, wrote in a March 3 essay in Global Affairs magazine that his country stands “at the crossroads of key trends” in the field of international relations and underlined that Russia, has “a special role in European and global history.”

Unfortunately, average citizens of the West, especially of the USA, know little and understand less of Russia’s history. To the great majority of Westerners, Russia is a mysterious and forbidding land somewhere in the East which poses a threat to the world which it aims at dominating. Therefore, I have summarized here some aspects of that long history in order to amplify and elucidate Russia’s possible role in the “difficult period of international relations”, of which Lavrov speaks so clearly and rationally.

The history of Russia has been marked, on the one hand, by constantly recurring patterns of fascination for and attraction to the West, and on the other hand abhorrence of and isolation from the same West to which Russia throughout its long history has often wanted to belong. To a certain degree Russia is different. Most Russians themselves are convinced of certain “particular Russian qualities” differentiating them from Western man—qualities not understood, and on the contrary, oftentimes misunderstood by the West. These characteristics can be described as components of a great messianic spirit: the Russian people have often believed themselves destined to be the salvation of the world.

While the few periods of wide contacts with the West have renewed the country, given it new vigor and skills and broken a chain of reaction tyranny, those purely Russian characteristics—tenacity, endurance, spiritualism, ethnic unity, love for mankind and popular traditions have given the country superhuman strength in periods of crisis. Russians never give up. Resistance is in the national DNA. Russians consider themselves invincible as a nation of which there are many examples: the battles of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad.

Since early Muscovy, even after Ivan the Great in the 15th century who had defeated the Mongol occupiers of Russia, tripled Russia’s territory and making it a major European nation, and exchanged ambassadors and traders with the outside world, contact between Russians and foreigners was discouraged if not forbidden because they were considered contaminating even for the Tsar himself. And consequently secluded in special residential areas of Moscow.

While this great nation was being born, persecuted Europeans, adventurers and criminals were making their way to today’s USA, where they built log cabins and began the exterminations of the native peoples they encountered.

In comparison, sixteenth century Russia under Tsar Ivan the Terrible had become a formidable European power. It expanded its borders to the South but was defeated in its effort to conquer the Baltic States to the West. Those defeats in the West served to emphasize the necessity to modernize the Russian state. Ivan’s severe reforms and the methods employed to achieve them divided the country and sent many Russians in flight to the borderlands and beyond, joining the free-living Cossacks in the steppes.

Keep in mind that centuries were passing. And Russia was advancing, having liberated itself from the yoke of Tartar occupiers. Europeans and more and more Russians themselves understood that they were a great power to be reckoned with. The expanses, the realization of the great wealth their lands contain, the nation’s potential power, and importantly a unifying worldview (mirovozreniye) began welding the Russians together as a nation state.

It fell to Peter the Great (17th and early 18th centuries) to effect a “window on Europe”. Numerous Russians of all classes were sent abroad to learn necessary skills for Russia’s affirmation as a modern European nation, permitting Peter to build his new capital of Saint Petersburg on the Baltic Sea facing the West. Russians became cognizant of a new way of life and perceived new approaches to social living, shaking Russia out of its self-imposed isolation while the huge country also shook off any remaining inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West. By the end of Peter’s reign in 1725, the upper classes had indeed moved toward Europe, adopting European manners and dress and snobbishly preferring to speak French in the salons and the Court. The masses, the Russian people, a spiritual people, however, remained fixed and committed to old Russian traditions and the Orthodox religion.

As the 18th century progressed and while what became the USA was still a British colony, Catherine the Great imported ideas of French enlightenment—ideas however not yet compatible with traditional Russian views. She came to realize that the thinking of Voltaire and Rousseau were dangerous, a danger to herself … and a threat to Tsardom as well. This was long the great historical dilemma for the rulers of Russia: the nation’s need of Western knowhow in order to maintain its position as a world power and the concomitant threats these new influences posed to the system. In any case, by the end of the century the upper classes had learned a new way of life while they also came to recognize their own backwardness.

But the masses continued to toil and repeat generation after generation the old way of life. Such was the setting for the blossoming of Russian intellectual and social thought in the 19th century.

The French invasion of 1812 and Russia’s subsequent victory over Napoleon’s armies and the occupation of Paris changed Russian life.

For the first time in its history great numbers of ordinary Russians—as opposed to the privileged classes of the previous century—had close contact with one of the major centers of Western civilization. Young, educated military officers brought back from France new customs; but more important were the new ideas which fascinated and enraptured Russian intellectuals. In the face of the veritable explosion of these Western ideas, Alexander I was forced to renege on the promises of the liberalism of his youth. A new period of repression began. Nevertheless, the mild movement for a Constitution by some of the guards officers, the so-called, “Decembrists” of 1825, were crushed by the Tsar. Yet it was too late. Things had changed in Russia. The gentry and other educated classes were infected and began to resist the closed society.

The clash between autocracy in need of modernization but aware that those same ideas endangered its existence and the more enlightened educated classes no longer capable of living in darkness gave birth to the first Russian political emigration: intellectuals who left their homeland to fight for their ideals. The conservatives at home, horrified at how far they had moved away from old Russian traditions by becoming nearly Europeans began resisting European influences, thus articulating a struggle between themselves—the so-called Slavophiles—and the Westernizers. All the while the masses were silent.

In the 1830s and 40s, many liberal-minded men in Russia, suffocated by oppression because of their new ideas, by censorship and political backwardness, emigrated to Europe to study and struggle for fundamental freedoms for their people. The earliest émigrés went to France, England and Switzerland where they supported a program for a Constitution and reforms.

With the birth of Socialism in Europe, Russian socialists were soon born among these intellectuals. The departure of Alexander Herzen from Moscow to Europe in 1847 marked the beginning of a new era of Russian social-political thought which was to result in the overthrow of Tsardom and the Bolshevik victory over its more moderate opponents contesting for power in Russia.

The crushing of the Decembrists of 1825, the execution and exile of their leaders, and simultaneously the new ideas advanced by young liberals had made a great impression on Herzen who dedicated his life work to the cause of Russia democracy. Herzen symbolized the move of Russian émigrés from thought to action. Herzen and friends and later the anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, initiated a movement centered around their political journal, The Bell, a movement democratic in nature, promoting a union between the governed and the governing in Russia and encouraging Russians in the homeland to overthrow autocracy. The Bell, published in London, circulated among intellectuals in the homeland, and allegedly read by the Tsar himself, was born on the wave of revolution raging across Europe and survived to introduce the revolutionary current of Lenin, Russian socialists and the later Bolsheviks.

During this period occurred the Mexican-American War (1846-47), in which Mexico lost half of its national territory to the Yankees, a war which became the model of American imperialistic wars, ultimately becoming world-wide, in Latin American, Asia, Europe and Africa. The war against Mexico was soon followed by the American Civil War, 1861-65, at the price of 600,000 dead in the name of US capitalism. Two new world powers, Russia in the East and the Unites States in the West were emerging, powers which that within a century would submerge the old European nation states.

Herzen, however, did not have the stuff that revolutionaries are made of. He had attacked Tsardom with the written word while in that period of crisis only extremes counted. Thus, Herzen inevitably fell from favor among younger, revolutionary émigrés. The struggles between the right and the left among Russian intellectuals left Herzen behind as an anachronism. Intellectuals meanwhile split over the concept of revolution—the moderates for whom some form of constitutional democracy was the goal moved toward the conservatives while the more liberal passed to the side of the revolutionaries. The next wave of Russian émigrés was to be dominated by the revolutionaries headed by Lenin.

Russia’s revolutionaries were a fiery bunch, as divided and factious as the Western left today. Russian revolutionaries disagreed, fought and split, and regrouped. But the movement was carried implacably forward by the organized hard core of the movement led by Vladimir Lenin. In essence, the various currents among Russian revolutionaries continued to reflect the old dispute between Westernizers and more traditional Slavophiles, a modern Western socio-political philosophy or the old Russian traditions, which are still the two deep souls of Russia. In this case, Russian Marxists, European in outlook, looked toward the new proletariat as their base. The Socialist Revolutionary wing counted instead on the peasants and, in a broad sense, the Russian people. The necessary support of both these currents was harnessed by Lenin and his successors after they won the revolution and the Civil War.

The Russian Civil War which erupted after the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 was marked by Western intervention (British, American, French and Japanese) on the side of the anti-revolutionary “Whites”. Since then Russian-American relations, despite alliances during European wars and various commercial agreements, have been based on American Capitalism’s unrelenting opposition to Socialism/Communism. Moreover, I believe there is also an underlying anti-Russian spirit present, perhaps because of American jealousy of Russia’s expanses and wealth, or ,even something more spiritual. The Cold War is most exemplary of America’s fundamental attitude, not only toward Russian Communism but also toward Russia itself.
It is paradoxical that the eyes of the two new nations among world powers, Russia and the USA, still antagonistic toward each other after a century of seeing each other’s reflection in Europe, today are both looking eastwards. Despite the US encirclement of Russia and its goal of regime change and dismemberment of its old enemy, despite the proxy wars in Syria, despite America’s return to Latin America and the expansion of its presence in Africa, nothing can be more threatening to the USA than the terrifying image of the Russian-Chinese alliance. Lavrov’s words of Russia and a crossroads should scare the Jesus out of Washington.


Gaither StewartSenior Editor Gaither Stewart, based in Rome, serves—inter alia—as our European correspondent. A veteran journalist and essayist on a broad palette of topics from culture to history and politics, he is also the author of the Europe Trilogy, celebrated spy thrillers whose latest volume, Time of Exile, was recently published by Punto Press.

 


 

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Russia-Ukraine war – Crimea, 2 years of “occupation” what happened, what do locals think?

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=By=

Alexander Chopov, PhD.

Sevastopol residents at a celebratory show held after the referendum on Crimea's status. (RIA Novosti/Valeriy Melnikov)

Sevastopol residents at a celebratory show held after the referendum on Crimea’s status. (RIA Novosti/Valeriy Melnikov)

[dropcap]I[/dropcap]t has been two years since Crimea’s separation from Ukraine. If you listen to the Western press, Crimea was stolen by Russia in a land grab in the wake of “confusion” following the Ukrainian (or Maidan) Revolution of 2014. What happened then in Crimea is critically important to understand the ongoing war. Further, understanding the history of the region provides a vital context for the war. These are the topics tackled by Alexander Chopov in the fourth episode of War In Ukraine – The Unreported Truth.

In Russia-Ukraine war – Crimea. 2 years of “occupation” what happened, what do locals think?, Alexander Chopov gives a succinct historical recap of the region and of the post Maidan Revolution, speaks with some of the people in the area asking how they see themselves, and how they feel about rejoining Russia. This video is a critical contribution to cutting through the lies and propaganda about the events in Ukraine, and the continuing allegations of Russian overreach.


To view other videos in the series, use the slider below.[metaslider id=118987]


Alexander Chopov, Ph.D.  is the Director and Producer of a new YouTube Channel – War in Ukraine – the Unreported Truth. The purpose of the channel is to give the people of Donbass an English voice so they can be heard beyond Donbass. Dr. Chopov  has a double major in International Affairs from George Washington University, and a doctorate in political science from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. He interned in the US Congress,  and has lived in US for over 10 years studying both American mentality and politics.


 

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Ron, Gorby and Nancy Too: What Might Have Been

black-horizontalPast in Present Tense with Murray Polner

 

Reagans and Gorbachevs

President Ronald Reagan and first lady Nancy Reagan greet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife Raisa outside the White House before a State Dinner, Dec. 8, 1987. Earlier in the day, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty to eliminate intermediate-range missiles. (AP Photo/Ron Edmonds)

 


[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he first and only time I saw Mikhail Gorbachev was when his motorcade sped down Manhattan’s Third Avenue one sunny day in the eighties while tens of thousands cheered the man who was trying to reform his morally and politically bankrupt nation and reduce the threat of cold and hot wars. As his car raced by I raised two fingers in  V, Dove-like, style.

I also saw Ronald Reagan once when I caught sight of him as he and Nancy entered a posh Manhattan hotel for some party bash. The large crowd cheered, but I didn’t raise my fingers in salute. I had, after all, voted for the Carter and Mondale.

Who thought then that Gorby the communist, and Ron the hawk, urged on by his shrewd and smart wife to meet and talk with the Russian, would become friends and warm pen pals  and more importantly, advocates for a more peaceful, non-nuclear world, as we now definitively know from the release of the Gorbachev File, which marked the Russian’s  85th birthday on March 2, 2016, by the non-governmental National Security Archive [NSA], which houses an invaluable collection of declassified material.

The Gorbachev File covers once-secret British and American documents from March 1985 to 1991 and especially the Reagan-Gorbachev correspondence. After meeting Gorbachev in London in December 1984, Margaret Thatcher was so taken with him that she wrote Reagan the Russian was “fully in charge” and “determined to press ahead with his internal reform,” except on nuclear abolition, which she opposed but Reagan did not. Still, she told Reagan, who she liked and admired, “I like Gorbachev. We can do business together.”

Three months later, the CIA agreed, accepting that that something new and different was happening in the Soviet Union and Gorbachev was “the new broom,” a conclusion Washington’s unreconstructed cold warriors and especially its neocons, always ready to fight wars with our kids but rarely if ever with theirs, found hard to accept.

But the CIA had its doubts and still considered Gorbachev a “tough” hard-liner who would be a difficult partner at any summit meeting. They believed his “new broom” only applied to domestic affairs, which was an error, comments the NSA, given that, for example, the old Stalinist Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was soon  dumped by the moderate Eduard Shevardnadze, indicating to NSA that Gorbachev was in fact concerned with foreign policy.

In 1985, Reagan sent Gorbachev a handwritten letter (Reagan, as we know, was a compulsive, serious writer who kept a diary and  often wrote his own letters, without secretarial help) telling him he was ready “to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate” a “Russian removal” from Afghanistan, Moscow’s calamitous version of the American debacle in Vietnam.

That same year the two men met for the first time in Geneva. NSA commented, “both spoke about the mistrust and suspicions of the past and of the need to begin a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations….They both spoke about their aversion to nuclear weapons.”

Gorbachev quoted the Bible about moving past disagreements and Reagan responded by remarking  that “if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley’s Comet, then that knowledge would unite all peoples of the world.” Again NSA: “The aliens had landed, in Reagan’s view, in the form of nuclear weapons, and Gorbachev would remember this phrase, quoting it directly in his famous ‘new thinking’ speech at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.”

Visibly impressed, Reagan again wrote Gorbachev of his wish to work with him on arms control measures to “provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons,” yet another outrage to Washington’s entrenched hawks when they learned of Reagan’s intentions. They were even more indignant when Reagan invited Gorbachev to a summit in Washington where their friendship deepened.

Gorbachev, obviously pleased, wrote back that the USSR and USA had to maintain peace and “not let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war, which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides.”

Was Reagan, untutored in the intricacies and duplicities of foreign policy, a man who had once played dumb about Iran-Contra and backed a proxy war in Central America simply naive and too trusting? Yet somehow, unknown to his closest aides, let alone his pugnacious supporters, Reagan, the loner, was taken by his fear of a nuclear clash. Their correspondence and the 1986 Reykjavik, Iceland, summit shows them trying to pursue a course which their successors have ignored. NSA’s post has Reagan’s letters “sometimes personally dictated, even handwritten, explain their positions on arms control, strategic defenses, and the need for nuclear abolition.”

When they met in Iceland, they shocked many of their advisors and supporters by agreeing “in principle”  to remove intermediate range nukes from Europe and to restrict the number of missile warheads and then all nukes by within ten years.

The deal fell apart for a variety of reasons such as differences over “trust and verify” and the Star Wars Initiative, which Thatcher considered unworkable. The next year, however, saw some progress with the approval of the INF treaty but for both nation’s unrepentant hawks, the two leaders had been too nice to one another, too forgiving, too willing to forgive and forget. Reagan was denounced as an appeaser by some of his former admirers, and Gorbachev would be forced out in 1991. Among his other sins: Letting East Germany go without killing rebels, as the Chinese did at Tiananmen Square, and withdrawing Russian troops from Afghanistan, something Bush2 and Obama have not done. For both nations, then, negotiation was out and escalation was in.

All the same, one supportive group, the National Threat Initiative, chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn, had it right: Reykjavik “has remained in history as a near successful attempt of leaders of nuclear powers to agree on complete elimination of nuclear weapons.”

With Reagan retired, the deposed Gorbachev opposed the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1995, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and especially, despite American promises, the US-NATO move ever closer to Russia’s borders, which he believed represented a serious threat. Interviewed by the British newspaper, the Telegraph, in May 2008, he sounded bitter. “We had ten years after the Cold War to build a new world order and yet we squandered them,” adding, “The United States cannot tolerate anyone acting independently,” and “Every U.S. president has to have a war.” The article was headed, “Gorbachev: The U.S. Could Start a New Cold War.”

But still, Mikhail Gorbachev never forgot Ronald Reagan and their unusual friendship and what they hoped to accomplish. In 2004, he represented Russia at Reagan’s funeral and also traveled to Eureka College, Regan’s old school, where the aging Russian reformer was named “Honorary Reagan Fellow of Eureka College.”

And when Nancy died, Gorbachev told Interfax: “It was with deep sorrow that I learnt the sad news and I can rightfully say well done, Nancy. She said to Ronald Reagan: when you quit the post of U.S,. president, you need to go as a peacemaker. And the fact that we established human relations, which led to trust was mainly Nancy’s merit. Without trust, there is and can be no moving forward.”


Murray PolnerContributing Editor, Murray Polner wrote “No Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran“; “When Can I Come Home,” about draft evaders during the Vietnam era; co-authored with Jim O’Grady, “Disarmed and Dangerous,” a dual biography of Dan and Phil Berrigan; and most recently, with Thomas Woods,Jr., ” We Who Dared to Say No to War.” He is the senior book review editor for the History News Network.


ALL CAPTIONS AND PULL-QUOTES BY THE EDITORS, NOT THE AUTHORS.


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Russia-Ukraine War – examining evidence of Russian aggression

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=By= Alexander Chopov, PhD

UkraineRussiaWarScreenCaptrue

[dropcap]A[/dropcap]lexander Chopov brings us another hard-hitting expose of the truth in the Ukraine civil war, or the war between Ukraine and Russia if you get your news from the US biased press. In this episode of War in Ukraine – The Unreported Truth, Dr. Chopov dismantles the media lies about the war in a point by point manner.

 

Real Life Hunger Games

The Real Reason Behind the War


Alexander Chopov, Ph.D.  is the Director and Producer of a new YouTube Channel – War in Ukraine – the Unreported Truth. The purpose of the channel is to give the people of Donbass an English voice so they can be heard beyond Donbass. Dr. Chopov  has a double major in International Affairs from George Washington University, and a doctorate in political science from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. He interned in the US Congress,  has lived in US for over 10 years, and understands American mentality and politics.

 


 

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The Eurasian Year in Russian Foreign Policy

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=By= Timofei Bordachev

Russia-China Gazprom

Russia and China sign $400 billion gas deal (2014). By Kremlin.ru. (CC By 4.0)

[dropcap]2[/dropcap]015 was the year when Russia “discovered” Eurasia. Surprisingly, the continent that was the cradle of many ethnic groups and civilizations and the birthplace of great empires remained, until recently, on the periphery of Russian foreign policy perceptions.

An explanation may be found in the fact that Eurasia, despite its unique history, was not regarded – again until very recently – as an integral political and economic entity. It was torn between Europe and Asia, lacked an image and a supranational identity of its own, and was perceived as a space where the leading regional powers, Russia and China, were locked in rivalry.

Russia, China, and their regional partners managed to reverse these negative trends in the outgoing year. As early as May 8, one day before the Victory parade in Moscow, the Russian and PRC leaders signed a historic statement on the “pairing” of the Eurasian integration (EAEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt. In turn, the leaders of the Eurasian Five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) confirmed at their October 16 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan their intention to cooperate with China and instructed the EAEU Commission to coordinate the actions of the various national governments. At the same time, relations between Russia and China acquired a fundamentally new quality. Their distinguishing features are mutual trust, consideration for each other’s interests, and increasing economic openness. Russian-Chinese interaction is central to the emergence of an independent Eurasian pole of strength and constitutes its support base.

Not accidentally, Eurasia became one of the most popular topics in Russian foreign policy and foreign economic expert analysis, meriting dozens of media articles and research papers in recent months. The most important of these is the big Valdai report entitled “Toward the Great Ocean-3: Creating Central Eurasia.” On the other hand, the fear that these developments and decisions instilled in the Western expert community was unusual, even against the backdrop of the general over-excitement in the last couple of years.

The strategic objective in regional multilateral cooperation is to turn Eurasia in a zone for co-development that would be no less intensive than what exists between EU countries in Europe. Currently we can speak about the emergence of a “Eurasian moment,” a unique confluence of international political and economic circumstances that will make it possible to implement the cooperation and co-development potential of states in this macro-region.

The “conjugation” concept originated in early 2015 from awareness that Russia could no longer – nor should – look at Eurasia as its “backyard;” one that must be guarded, but not necessarily developed. Being hermetic and peripheral provokes outside forces into trying to destabilize the outskirts of Russia and China, to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, or to force other Eurasian states to make a choice between what is alleged to be mutually exclusive alternatives. Moreover, none of the contradictions between the leading Eurasian states that are discussed by political and academic circles can be called objective. Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and China’s western provinces form the natural center of Eurasia. The main motivating forces of Eurasia’s transformation into a co-development macro-region are potentially the most promising and mutually complementary projects of interstates and trans-border cooperation: Eurasian economic integration and large-scale partnership within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt as suggested by China in 2013.

The Eurasian integration and its institutional shell – the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) launched on January 1, 2015 – will help form the legal framework necessary for a joint leap forward, allowing the EAEU to emerge as an effective tool for preventing and solving interstate disputes. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s EAEU membership creates a situation where there is just one customs border between China and the EU market. A common customs and tariff space gives the Eurasian co-development project certain undeniable advantages, as Yevgeny Vinokurov and Taras Tsukarev from the Center for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank stated on the Valdai website.

While the EAEU shapes the legal framework for a transport and logistic infrastructure and joint development, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) will give it a huge trade and investment impetus. China’s record in creating inner economic belts will come in handy as efforts to organize new international and transcontinental economic belts capable of pooling resources, means of production and markets come under way.

In an environment where Russia has entered a prolonged period of poor relations with the USA and its allies, it is interested in ensuring that opportunities for its development are minimally dependent on the West. Russia needs to promote the Eurasian integration project and open it to new members. It is in its interests to create regional development institutions that would complement the existing international financial and economic institutions and to remove military challenges and threats along its southeastern perimeter, particularly in the region of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. One of Russia’s crucial national objectives is to sustain a course for boosting the economic and political importance of Siberia and the Russian Far East and to create conditions for making its strategic partnership with China irreversible.

China’s has a direct interest in building a system of international trade, economic and political cooperation in Eurasia, that would secure a transport corridor between the PRC and European markets, and be relatively independent of the traditional maritime routes; create favorable political conditions for implementing investment projects in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Siberia, and in the Russian Far East; minimize the risks and threats posed by Islamic extremism; and optimize efforts to develop western China, one of the strategic objectives confronting the state.

The region’s transport and logistic potential and the Eurasian co-development potential are huge indeed, especially considering the plans for creating trans-border investment clusters and priority development regions. The Eurasian economic belt is potentially cost efficient as well. It is not by chance that expanding the transport and logistic infrastructure is the key prerequisite and development vector in Central Eurasia. Implementing the SREB will make it possible to reduce cargo transportation distances on par with those realized by utilizing the Suez Canal route. The corridor is 8.4 thousand kilometers long, of which 3.4 thousand kilometers has been built in China and 2.8 thousand and 2.2 thousand kilometers are being built or modernized in Kazakhstan and Russia, respectively. An important advantage in this respect is that there is just one customs border – that between China and Kazakhstan – to be crossed.

But there are problems as well. Differences have surfaced in the approaches of certain EAEU countries. Some of Kazakhstan’s representatives, for example, believe that they can do without their EAEU allies and channel all Chinese investments in their country maximizing transit benefits. Local experts say it is impossible to develop a single EAEU strategy towards conjugating the Eurasian integration and the Silk Road.

None of the post-Soviet states has a chance for truly equitable relations with other partners aside from Russia. The EU can only offer a humiliating “integration without membership.” The great China will send in workers and build roads to ship out energy resources, but it will not protect them from external threats, let alone offer an equitable market regulation system, because it will never be able to forego even a modicum of its sovereignty. Meanwhile it is Kazakhstan that could head the mapping out of the transport component of the EAEU-Silk Road conjugation project.

It is another matter that Russia itself may inadvertently lose the eastern wind its sails caught in the spring. To tell the truth, inefficient interagency implementation can negate even the most brilliant diplomatic achievements. A purely bilateral approach to relations with China and its consideration outside the context of Eurasian or Asian cooperation may prove an insufficiently advantageous strategy.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization that includes Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is a separate story. The SCO has covered a lot of ground since its inception. Originally many saw it as a mechanism for coordinating Russian and Chinese interests in their “common neighborhood.” Simultaneously the member states sought to promote cooperation in new areas, like economic matters, countering terrorism, and politics. Occasionally the SCO – by analogy with BRICS – stepped forward to formulate alternative (non-Western) approaches to the world order.

Today, however, the organization has reached a crossroad, upon the crossing of which it will either slump into stagnation or acquire a new quality as Eurasia’s main international and political platform, as Alexander Lukin convincingly stated on the Valdai website.

The threats are quite serious. The recent decision to establish direct relations between the Eurasian Union and China (on the basis of a partnership and cooperation treaty) can deprive the SCO of its economic component. The expected, albeit uncertain, accession of India and Pakistan carries the risk of reducing the degree of SCO political unity. China is somewhat tired of the SCO’s frequent lack of enthusiasm for its economic initiatives and has begun going it alone by setting up powerful financial institutions like an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The SCO’s gradual fading away must be avoided as it is in the common interests of both Russia and China, and the Central Asian states that are aware of all the risks of political loneliness, particularly in the face of an iron-clad opponent in the West. If we want the Shanghai group to energize regional cooperation and development, it should be faced with strategic missions. It is necessary to offer SCO membership to other players: Mongolia, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and even Korea.

For Russia, a new international group under the SCO umbrella would mean the most important thing the country needs now – the deliverance from an age-old curse of having to choose between East and West. But it will not retreat into self-isolation and will cooperate with the ideologically close, important and rising regional partners. Russia may find its identity in an emerging world of regional groups through equitable cooperation rather than through confrontation and fencing itself off. Of course, it will have to cast a fresh glance at certain established international political clichés, primarily getting rid of its patronizing attitude toward the majority of Eurasian partner nations.

Simultaneously, high on the agenda is the emergence of a new quality of relations with Iran. After a breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear program, that country is increasingly active in different formats. Iran is a major Eurasian power and an important trade and economic partner for China (and potentially for Russia and other EAEU countries). To make confident progress in this regard, it is necessary to carefully consider all possible options and ways of cooperation, like preparing a preferential or non-preferential trade agreement, establishing a free trade area, or – why not! – encouraging Iranian accession to the Eurasian Union.

And, finally, for Russia itself the Eurasian vector and choice are important for an added reason: the incipient revitalization, albeit on a new basis, of relations with the European Union. The 2013−2015 military and political crises in Europe and the subsequent freezing of actually all relations between Russia and the EU (including suspension of all talks and dialogues) give us a unique opportunity to start these relations from scratch and on the basis of an integrated Russian strategy/concept with regard to the EU. Earlier this was impossible, because at stage one (the early 1990s − the early 2000s) Russia lacked an independent stance on this issue or experience in dealing with the EU. After 2003, the national policy in this area amounted to “correcting mistakes” committed in the earlier period.

Today is the most fortuitous juncture for taking stock of Russia’s real, not imposed, interests in relations with the EU. This means primarily the establishment of direct contacts between the EAEU and the EU and the latter’s recognition of Eurasian integration; it’s the promotion of energy cooperation; it’s the discussion of free movement, and other issues. Most importantly, is that all these issues should be based on Russia’s views and preferences rather than on something interpreted from a vague understanding of Brussels instructions or “Europocentric” models. For far too long we tried to adjust Russian approaches to the (rather limited) EU capabilities. Now we have a chance to make an entire model of relations inherently equitable.

The new EU neighborhood policy will be aimed at “stabilizing the geopolitical environment” rather than at transforming their neighbors. Europe needs peace and calm on its borders in order to attend to its inner problems and digest acquisitions of the recent years. For this reason, the EU will be sufficiently open within the next few years to perceiving ideas and proposals from external partners. Simultaneously, we mustn’t allow a slide back into the old rut, business as usual, meaning the former quite ambiguous cooperation model, where sides actively cooperated on a technical level, while having no clearly articulated strategic vision.

The progressive dynamics in Russian-Chinese relations, Eurasian integration, and Russia’s “pivot to the East” are factors that are clearly encouraging the Europeans to intensify their dialogue with Russia. As a powerful Eurasian player Russia will only be stronger in shaping new strategic relations with its traditional partners in the West. And conversely, only more stable relations with Europe will relieve us of unnecessary problems as we build a new Eurasian house for all inhabitants of our great continent. It is this that should become the national foreign policy priority for 2016.

 


Timofei Bordachev is Director, Eurasian Program, Valdai International Discussion Club.

Source
Article:  Valdai Discussion Club
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