WARS & MILITARY

PATRICE GREANVILLE—The shameful role of the media whores who totally underreported or actively supported this war cannot be emphasized often enough. As a result most Americans still have a dense fog of confusion in their minds about the empire’s adventures in Indochina: how it started, what purposes it served, and what lessons it should have taught us, but didn’t. I’m talking here about moral lessons. Today after almost half a century since the end of this atrocity, the same ruling elites are actively involved not just in pursuing several more criminal wars with no end in sight, but eagerly plotting and provoking not just more conventional wars, but possibly the biggest chestnut of them all, the chestnut that will kill us all: a nuclear war with China or Russia or probably both.

PATRICK ARMSTRONG—One cannot avoid asking when did the USA last win a war. You can argue about what “win” looks like but there’s no argument about a surrender ceremony in the enemy’s capital, whether Tokyo Bay or Berlin. That is victory. Helicopters off the Embassy roof is not, pool parties in a U.S. Embassy is not, “Black Hawk down” is not. Doubling the USSR’s record in Afghanistan is not. Restoring the status quo ante in Korea is not defeat exactly, but it’s pretty far from what MacArthur expected when he moved on the Yalu. When did the USA last win a war? And none of the post-1945 wars have been against first-class opponents.

TAMIR ESHEL—In recent months the Syrian Army, supported by Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Russian air and ground forces, regained a significant foothold in areas previously dominated by Syrian opposition and ISIS. The loss rate of its armor has also diminished, not because of a shortage of rebel weapons. The Syrians claim that the deployment of new countermeasures locally developed by the Syrian Scientific Research Center (SSRC) dramatically reduced the vulnerability of their armor to rebel guided missiles attacks. This article tracks the evolution of these systems and outlines the progress, based on combat experience gained by the Syrians.

This an English language version of a Soviet documentary about the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow. Warning – graphic images. Edward G. Robinson narrates. It won the 1943 Academy Award for Best Documentary (along with the films The Battle of Midway, The Kokoda Line!, and Prelude to War (Why We Fight Film 1).

Because of a complex system of unit rotations, each soldier spent an average of only 15 percent of his time in the firing line, 10 percent in support trenches, a further 30 percent in reserve trenches further back and almost half his time, 45 percent, out of the trenches entirely. Now, that is entirely inter-dependent on the front we are talking about, and the army involved. A Russian soldier for example, would have a 40% chance of surviving in 1916.