
John Helmer
DANCES WITH WOLVES
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THE INCITATUS PRECEDENT IN US STRATEGY, THE CALIGULA CURE IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY
by John Helmer, Moscow • @bears_with
There has never been a transition between US presidential administrations which has been so replete with new Washington-directed violence across the world. That’s to say, the escalation of wars already under way and the instigation of new ones to the furthest limits of the US empire’s reach.
As the Pentagon war-gaming of the Reagan Administration proved in secret, neither escalation of conventional war nor escalation to nuclear war can be controlled when Americans are running the game. That’s because Americans always think they have firepower superiority (aka shock and awe).
That this superiority has been defeated since 2022 with the destruction of every US weapon and operation plan on the Ukrainian battlefield has spurred the projection of Washington’s denial – that’s Freudian denial — to every other untested battlefield.
Across the Pacific this US escalation now extends from the martial law attempt in South Korea to coup attempts in Bolivia and Venezuela, the threat of trade war against Mexico, and forcing Canada to submit, as Donald Trump has just told Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, to “becom[ing] the 51st state and Trudeau could become its governor.” .
Australia, the rich rear base of the US, is under orders to spend more on US arms and bases for US and Japanese forces to fight land, sea, air, and space war against China; for less low-cost raw materials to China, for more tributary payment to the US.
This campaign of politics by means of war and war by political means is now existential for both the outgoing and incoming US presidents, and for each of the countries which are their targets. Submission, and the readiness to pay the US demand for billions of dollars in economic and military costs, have become a display of ambition and fear on Roman imperial scale – of the example of the Roman senators ready to kowtow to Incitatus (“Full Speed”), Caligula’s race horse. The Swiss-Serbian geopolitician Slobodan Despot has recently explained this:
“If [European Commission President] Ursula von der Leyen appointed her pony as the European Union’s Foreign Minister, do you think anyone would object? And that the brave animal would be less competent in this position than Mr. Borrell [EU Foreign Minister] or Ms. Kallas [EU Vice President]?… What if by chance Caligula had really appointed his equine senator? Without blinking, the senators would have treated him with all the respect due to his rank. These people were probably no dumber than the satraps of today, but they were not driven by their own reason, or even by their well-understood interests. They were spurred on by fear and by its proactive counterpart, sickly ambition.”
Like the Roman senators and the legion commanders of Caligula’s time (37-41 AD), the fear today is of US-directed political, economic, and physical elimination, as has been tested in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Teheran, and in Slovakia on Prime Minister Robert Fico.
For resistance to Caligula’s horse in Washington, President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated signal success. He has also introduced several innovations in counterforce weaponry against the US and its allies from which they have no effective protection. With Kinzhal, Oreshnik and other weapons named but not yet launched by the Russian side, US escalation without counterforce protection or defence of city grids and civilian populations is irrational. The Incitatus Precedent can work only when the emperor is mad and his subjects are in abject fear or mad ambition or both at once.
The outcome of that in first-century Rome was the Caligula Cure – elimination by force.
In the Third Rome these days, there remains a group of high, very high officials who have reason to be afraid of the Incitatus Precedent and the Caligula Cure. They and their oligarch allies have also believed, and for more than twenty years invested in their safe-haven stable beyond the emperor’s reach.
Their names aren’t important to identify; they are well-known. What is important to know for now is what they believe, and especially what they hope the incoming Trump Administration can be persuaded and bribed to do, at least toward themselves.
Vzglyad, the government-financed internet publication in Moscow, is their mouth organ. Yesterday, there appeared in Vzglyad an essay explaining what they are thinking. Their idea, according to the publication, is composed of three options for Russian strategy.
In translating this verbatim into English, illustrations, map inserts, captions, and URL references have been added to assist the reader. As translator I express no opinion, neither strategic, military, Freudian, nor veterinary.
Vzglyad essay published here on December 3. The writer is Gevorg Mirzayan, an associate professor at the University of Finance and research fellow of the US-Canada Studies Institute in Moscow. To date, Mirzayan has not found fault with the translations he has read here.
What will be the finale of Cold War 2.0?
December 3, 2024
By Gevorg Mirzayan
Thirty-five years have passed since the statement of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States that the cold war between the two superpowers is over. However, Moscow and Washington understood the reasons for the end of the mutual confrontation in different ways – and how it is now necessary to build international relations. On the one hand, the resulting Cold War 2.0 must be ended; on the other hand, in a completely different way.
Exactly 35 years ago – on December 3, 1989 – Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George H.W. Bush met in Malta. And there they officially declared the end of the almost 40-year period of the cold war. They declared the advent of an era of “lasting peace” where ideological differences would no longer matter.
Left: President Bush on board the USS Belknap off Malta for the summit meeting in December 1989. Behind and to his right was the Soviet missile cruiser, Slava, carrying Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev. Right: The launch carrying Bush approaches the Soviet cruise liner Maxim Gorky. Because of storm weather, the site of the December 2-3 summit between Bush and Gorbachev was moved from the two warships to the Gorky at its shore berth.
Today it becomes clear that the parties understood the essence of the agreement in completely different ways. As well as the conditions for the end of the war – the definition of who won it, who lost it, and what should be the further structure of this “lasting peace”.
“Initially, Moscow and Washington had diametrically opposed approaches to this issue. The United States unilaterally declared its unconditional victory – ‘with God’s grace,’ as George H.W. Bush said in 1992 – in the Cold War. And this victory, from the point of view of the United States, should have marked the beginning of an infinite era of American global dominance. ["Just more and more and better capitalism till kingdom come.." —Ed.] A unipolar world, the universal spread of American values – and the end of history, which Francis Fukuyama proclaimed,” Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Higher School of Economics Centre for Integrated European and International Studies, explains to Vzglyad.
In this case, the end of history does not mean some kind of global apocalypse, but the end of the global competition of ideas (which, in fact, was the story). That, according to the United States, ended with the total and eternal victory of the "liberal democratic" model [capitalist tyranny], which (after first the defeat of fascism, and then of the Soviet project) no longer had competitors. And the era was coming, not just of American domination, but of the complete reconstruction of the world in line with American values, views and interests.
The United States has been acting on this principle since the 1990s. The wars in Yugoslavia, interference in the internal affairs of all countries (including Russia), attempts to force recognition of US hegemony and its right alone to decide the fate of the “conquered” world.
The principle of Brennus, leader of the Gauls, voiced by him to the Romans and adopted by them, worked for the United States: Vae Victis, “Woe to the vanquished”. The winner takes all.
After Brennus had defeated the Romans in battle and the city was surrendering, the Romans tried to ransom themselves from military destruction with an offer of tribute. They then argued over the scales for measuring their compliance, so Brennus used his sword to tip the scale in his favour. A late 19th century French illustration for the sale of a meat extract illustrates what happened.
Russia did not agree with this approach even in the 1990s, during the Yeltsin era. First of all, with the large-scale expansion of NATO to the East. In the decade of 2000-2010, US interference in the affairs of the post–Soviet space was added to this, including a series of colour revolutions. At the same time, Moscow tried to resolve the matter peacefully – that is, to agree on the rules of the game. For example, the proposal for a new collective security system from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
“From Moscow’s point of view, the Cold War ended with the voluntary agreement of the great powers to end the confrontation. And the cold war should be replaced by a multipolar world in which Russia, the United States and other centres of power on an equal basis had to form a new world order, exercise global governance, maintain international security and so on,” says Suslov.
However, in the United States, Moscow’s position was interpreted differently. “Russian disagreement with American hegemonic policy in the United States was perceived as a relapse of revisionism and Russia’s attempt to rewrite the history of the end of the Cold War. To review its results, including through the use of military force,” Suslov adds.
And this eventually led to the resumption of the Cold War – or as some experts say, Cold War 2.0. But now this looks much more dangerous than the previous one.
As before, the United States is trying to inflict strategic defeat on Russia. As then, sanctions and other methods of pressure are used. But now the conflict zone is not on the periphery – that is, in the countries of the third world, but instead in the space of one of the rival powers. In this case Russia, whose sovereign territory is occupied by Ukraine, which, in turn, is armed, financed and directed by the United States.
“In the last cold war, the confrontation in the central sector was considered fraught with a global war, so, in practical outcome, the confrontation was channeled to the periphery. But now it is taking place both on the periphery (for example, the terrorist offensive in Syria) and in the central direction – that is, in Ukraine,” says Suslov.
RUSSIAN MILITARY BLOGGER SITUATION REPORTS ON THE WAR IN SYRIA
Mikhail Zvinchuk’s Rybar situation report for the Idlib and Aleppo fighting as of December 3, 22:00. It is made clear in the Russian milblog reporting that the adversaries are the US, Turkey, Israel and their proxies, and that theirs is not a “terrorist offensive”; source -- https://t.me/rybar/65997 There is a ban on Russian mainstream media discussion of the restrictions placed on the Russian command in Syria so that they may not defend against the Turks, Americans or Israelis.

Boris Rozhin’s Colonel Cassad reports an offensive by US trained, armed and directed proxy forces at Syrian Army positions in the Deir ez-Zor region in eastern Syria. Rozhin does not identify the operation as a “terrorist” one. Source: https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146564 .
Boris Rozhin’s Colonel Cassad reports an offensive by US trained, armed and directed proxy forces at Syrian Army positions in the Deir ez-Zor region in eastern Syria. Rozhin does not identify the operation as a “terrorist” one. Source: https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146564 . In addition, the quality of American statesmen has plummeted. Brought up in the 1990s era of American supremacy, the current elites of the United States are not just unready to make some kind of compromise (that is, to recognize Russia’s right to its national interests); but also they do not even fully understand all the risks of the absence of compromise. First of all, there is the risk of nuclear combat.
There are only three possible options for ending the Cold War 2.0. The first, the most terrible and unnecessary for anyone in the world, is its spillover into hot war, and then into the thermonuclear phase.
Just published on December 2-3, 2024, this report of the top-secret 1983 Pentagon war game, Proud Prophet, concludes that the American military and civilian officials who participated on the US and the Soviet sides escalated to nuclear war because “nuclear war cannot be controlled”. The report failed to note this was a conclusion about American warfighters, not Russian ones who were not invited to play their part in the game. Although the report identifies the Harvard economist Thomas Schelling as the game designer, Schelling had already come privately to the conclusion that the evidence of the Pentagon Papers on the Vietnam War and USAF plans for nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union were escalatory for ideological and psychopathological reasons on the US side. Privately, Schelling told me in 1971 he was persuaded that the only option for an adversary was to inflict strategic defeat, as happened in the Vietnam War.
Just published on December 2-3, 2024, this report of the top-secret 1983 Pentagon war game, Proud Prophet, concludes that the American military and civilian officials who participated on the US and the Soviet sides escalated to nuclear war because “nuclear war cannot be controlled”. The report failed to note this was a conclusion about American warfighters, not Russian ones who were not invited to play their part in the game. Although the report identifies the Harvard economist Thomas Schelling as the game designer, Schelling had already come privately to the conclusion that the evidence of the Pentagon Papers on the Vietnam War and USAF plans for nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union were escalatory for ideological and psychopathological reasons on the US side. Privately, Schelling told me in 1971 he was persuaded that the only option for an adversary was to inflict strategic defeat, as happened in the Vietnam War. The second option is the infliction of strategic defeat on the United States through the strategy of a thousand injections (regional wars in the post–Soviet space, the Middle East, and East Asia, which will morph into a split in American society and result in internal destabilization). This outcome is also not needed by the responsible Great Powers. At the very least, this is because it will lead to a global economic crisis since the United States is the second largest economy on the planet.
The best ending to Cold War 2.0 can – and should – be the third option. This is the one which Russia originally had in mind in the guise of the USSR back in time, thirty-five years ago.
This finale can be formalized through a new agreement between Russia and the United States (as well as China, Iran and other Great Powers). As part of such an agreement, the parties will announce the end of the new cold war, but this time with a common understanding of the terms of their agreement. This will also be perceived in the United States as a defeat – but in fact it will be a universal victory.
The United States must abandon its claims to global hegemony and become a normal Great Power. One of the poles in a multipolar world. And in this multipolar system, the parties will combine both rivalry and cooperation in their relations with each other. And in this outcome, along with the second cold war the first one will be completely over.
by Editor - Tuesday, December 3rd, 2024
ACT TWO
The Kremlin’s Oprichniki Versus the General Staff’s Prigozhniki in the New Time of Troubles •
JOHN HELMER • DECEMBER 11, 2024
The defeat of the Russian army in war discredits, not the soldiers who fought and died, but the commander-in-chief and the generals who were in command. Defeat on the battlefield also destroys Russian military honour as a political force in the country, just as its opposite, victory on the battlefield, threatens the civilian commander-in-chief with his replacement by a soldier hero.
To protect himself from his triumphant, and also from his disgruntled officers, the commander-in-chief may make his generals scapegoats for the defeat. Joseph Stalin had begun shooting scapegoat officers before the German invasion of June 21, 1941, and then accelerated his purge in the weeks which followed. In 1946, in the aftermath of the Red Army’s victory over Germany, Stalin neutralized Marshal Georgiy Zhukov (for the second time), stripping him of his command powers and sending him into internal exile, all for purely political reasons. Stalin had allowed Zhukov to lead the victory parade in Red Square but only after Stalin had tried himself and failed to stay in the saddle of the white horse. Stalin’s jealousy of Zhukov’s domestic popularity was compounded by his (not unreasonable) fear of a military putsch and of the Caligula Cure.
For most Russians – and this has been a consistent finding of public opinion polling by the independent Levada Centre of Moscow – the President’s popularity, public trust, and approval of his performance run about 10 points ahead of the Russian trust in the Army. However, the two support each other on the upswing in the polls when there are victories to celebrate; and then on the downswing when there are defeats, rising casualties, and war fatigue across the countryside. Between 2022 and now, for example, Russian approval of Putin has risen to the 80% level; for the Army approval has also risen to about 70%.
It is the conclusion of the Kremlin and of the General Staff, therefore, that they should either hang together or if not, they will hang each other.
Having opposed but obeyed Putin’s orders forbidding them to fire on Israeli aircraft attacking Syria, or on Turkish ground operations in and around Idlib, Moscow sources believe the General Staff have now told Putin much more than the refrain, he’s heard many times before, “We told you so”. This time the General Staff assessment of the invasion of Syria, refusal of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to fight, and the replacement of the Assad regime in Damascus is that grave damage has been done to the protective alliances which Russia has been promoting in Africa, the Americas, China, and North Korea.
“We just have to accept that Iran and Russia have been comprehensively defeated in their non-fight, “a well-informed Moscow source says. “It is the worst defeat of Russia by the Turks in history. If Putin goes on now to make significant concessions in an Istanbul II negotiation with [President Donald] Trump, that will be the cherry on top of the Turkish halva. We are thinking this; no one is saying it. In the end, a defeat in Ukraine is all we care about. If Putin fails to deliver that, then he has a much bigger problem than the one he has just retreated from. Yes, this is a huge dishonour for us, but nothing is served by talking of it. Still, the situation can be redeemed in the Ukraine. This means the complete and comprehensive defeat of the enemy there.”
A non-Russian military source says the Russians he knows are “in denial. The Turks can now say we have them where we want them. This means the Israelis and the Americans can say the same. That means leverage above and beyond the Levant, in Africa, Asia and no less in Ukraine. What do the Russians have to offer their African or Asian friends now? Do they say — we’ll be there for you, of course, until the end – we mean your end. Of course, when the going gets tough, and potentially that means fighting the Americans or one of its proxy armies, the Russians now show they will blame their unwillingness to fight on their friends’ refusal to do what the Russians advise; their military incompetence; their corruption; or their racial inferiority compared to Russians.”
Russian military honour, as Russians understand it, is a code of uncorrupted selflessness and individual sacrifice in defence of the country. In national polling, this has been expressed by the consistently high approval of the Army. No other public institution, neither the presidency nor the Church, has drawn strength of support of this moral character.
Military performance on the battlefield counts, however. After rising sharply in the first year, 2022, of the Special Military Operation, trust in the Army began to decline in 2023 and 2024. According to a Levada report of six weeks ago, “confidence in the army remains quite high – 69%, but slowly decreases (by 8 percentage points since August 2022). The level of trust in the state security agencies and the police, on the contrary, gradually grows to 63% (an increase of 18 percentage points since August 2021) and to 48% (an increase of 19 percentage points since August 2021), respectively. The attitude to the prosecutor’s office and the courts remains unchanged – 43% and 31%, respectively.
RUSSIAN TRUST IN THE PRESIDENCY, THE ARMY IN NATIONAL POLLING 1994-2024
Click on source to enlarge — https://www.levada.ru/
Levada polling also reveals that the brief rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner force in June 2023 drew considerable public support for what Prigozhin said in criticism of high government officials; but at the same time, there was considerable public opposition to what Prigozhin did in his armed revolt. For analysis of the Prigozhin affair, read this; and for the outcome in Prigozhin’s death, read more.
For the time being, the events in Syria have drawn no public criticism either of Putin’s performance or the Army’s by Prigozhniki – that’s to say, critics, not rebels. Instead, the Oprichniki, guardians of Putin’s reputation and public support, have imposed a comprehensive blackout of news, direct commentary, and published analysis of Kremlin policy in Syria and Russian military operations there.
The President has said nothing himself. At a Kremlin ceremony on December 9 to present awards for military valour, Putin said “we take pride in the courage of our soldiers fighting in the special military operation zone. Their resolve leaves no doubt that we will triumph, and that no-one will ever succeed in subjugating or overpowering Russia.” No medals for valour in Syria, no mention of Syria at all.
The Kremlin has deterred media discussion of Putin’s policy of allowing Israel to attack Syrian and Iranian targets at will; and his parallel policy of allowing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a free hand in Idlib, as well as along the Syrian frontier with Turkey.
Putin has already tried scapegoating: the commander of Russian forces in Syria, General Sergei Kisel (right), was removed on December 1. Intended for publication by the Russian military bloggers, the official line was that Kisel was incompetent. “The Syrian sandbox,” claimed Mikhail Zvinchuk, publisher of the Defense Ministry-linked Rybar blog, “ has long been a place for laundering the reputations of unsuccessful generals who turned out to be incompetent in the zone of the special military operation.” There has been no Russian to ask publicly how the Russian commander in Syria and the General Staff can act if the Kremlin has tied their hands. Instead, the Kremlin has encouraged media blame for Bashar al-Assad and his allies for their weakness. Among some Russian military analysts this also becomes the racist characterization of the Arab inferiority compared to Russian superiority.
Military sources in Moscow acknowledge that sooner or later there must be a Russian fight with the Turks, but not now. Instead, Kremlin and Foreign Ministry spokesmen are claiming that they are negotiating with the Turks for the security of the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim airbase. Unasked, unanswered is the question – is it the Commander-in-chief’s decision to keep the bases and fight for them if necessary; or has he decided to evacuate under terms of safe passage guaranteed by Turkey, Israel, and the US?
In the four-hundred year history of the Russo-Turkish wars, there have been a handful of Russian defeats in battle; there is no record until now of a Russian retreat from battle without firing a shot. In World War I there was a tactical retreat by Russian forces from Trebizond in February of 1914, but the Turkish military gains were reversed over the next four years. The fight the Red Army then put up to defend the Russian Caucasus from the Turks between 1919 and 1921 is a historical reminder of the strategic purpose the General Staff have had in projecting Russian military force to the south of Turkey; that’s to say, Syria. The lessons of the reversal of that power projection, combined with the escalating war against Russia in Armenia and Georgia, have been brought to Putin’s attention.
In a report of December 10 by Vzglyad, the semi-official internet platform for security policy, sources were reported as claiming the Kremlin and General Staff had agreed on a partial withdrawal plan well in advance of the breakout of Idlib by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, Levant Liberation Council). “Russian representatives were probably negotiating to preserve the bases even before the militants in the north and the opposition in the south began their military operation.”
MAIN RUSSIAN MILITARY SITES IN SYRIA AS OF MAY 2022
Click on source for enlarged view. https://israel-alma.org/
This plan, according to Vzglyad’s sources, withdrew Russian units deployed at Palmyra, Mambij and in the Kurdish territories in the northeast of Syria; redeploy them inside the Tartus and Khmeimim bases; and open negotiations with the new powers in Damascus. “Russia will have to strengthen its presence in Syria –” Vzglyadreported, “establish relations with different parties, monitor them, observe and negotiate…It is impossible to leave the bases – they are of great geopolitical importance and ensure Russia’s presence in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.”
Vzglyad cites the well-known milblogger Alexander Kotz to point out that Russia’s bases in Syria are of strategic value. “To get to Africa, the Khmeimim air base has always been used as an intermediate point. If we are invited to leave, all agreements will be in jeopardy…Africa is now playing a crucial role for Russia. With the help of this region, we are ensuring the policy of a multipolar world and breaking through the isolation imposed by the West. Moreover, the loss of bases will affect our entire presence in the Mediterranean…If we leave Tartus, then hardly anyone in this region will ‘pour us a glass of fresh water.’ We will also have to minimize exercises in this area. At the same time, we should not trust the statements of the opposition which has come to power in Damascus. Thus, we face a long and difficult diplomatic path of negotiations with those representatives who have real political and military weight in the country now. We have specialists in such negotiations, because we conducted this process even when the active phase of the operation in Syria was underway until 2020. Of course, the situation has changed a lot now, but our diplomats have not gone anywhere.”
In Moscow, as the end of year celebrations get under way, sources claim to be in a “fighting mood. Our military leaders are earning the right to power, and there is nobody who doesn’t think that.” This is the sentiment among sources close to the General Staff and the Kremlin.
From Levada the most recent polling reveals brimming confidence in the future among Russians across the country. “Two-thirds of respondents (66%) feel confident in the future,” Levada reported on its survey conducted nationwide between November 21 and 27. “32% say the opposite. In the last two years, after the growth [of confidence in the direction of the country] in 2022, this indicator has not changed significantly. The sense of confidence in the future is more common among men (68%); young people up to 24 (79%); more affluent respondents (75% among those who can afford durable goods); residents of Moscow (76%); and those who approve of Putin’s performance as president (72%).”
Listen now to Chris Cook of Gorilla Radio lead today’s discussion of how Russia sees — and doesn’t see — the regime change and war in Syria.
Source: https://gradio.substack.com/
For the introduction to this broadcast, access to the 20-year Gorilla Radio archive, and Chris Cook’s blog, click here and here. For the lessons of how the US is fighting its war in Syria from the history of how the US has been fighting against the Arabs since 1943, read the book.
Born and raised in Australia, [John] Helmer graduated in political science from Harvard University in the United States. He published several books on military and political topics, including essays on the American presidency and on urban policy in the US and essays on Greek, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern politics and foreign policy. Since 1989 he has published almost exclusively on Russian topics.[1] He was married to Australian journalist and foreign correspondent Claudia Wright who died in 2005.[2]
Yuri Shvets alleged he was recruited by the KGB in the 1980s when he left to live in Russia permanently.[3] However, Victor Cherkashin claims that Helmer was unaware that Shvets was a KGB officer, and that Cherkashin himself called Shvets off. Later, after Shvets' concerns attracted controversy, Cherkashin confirmed that Helmer was not an agent.[4]
Helmer has been based in Moscow since 1989 and, from there, has worked for Australian Financial Review, The Australian and other newspapers.[5]
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1 comment
Helmer is balanced, informed and astute, as PCR is not.