Mike Mihajlovic

M. MIHAJLOVIC—Politically, the deployment of Poseidon adds a new dimension to strategic deterrence. Its autonomous nature and perceived “doomsday” capability suggest a weapon intended more for psychological and geopolitical signaling than for practical battlefield use. Its mere existence challenges traditional arms control frameworks and complicates stability calculations by introducing a new underwater axis of nuclear deterrence.

MIKE MIHAJLOVIC—Even the mere mention of a potential strike on the Kerch Bridge is enough to set off a wave of excitement among militarist commentators and sensationalist media figures, who elevate the concept to near-mythical proportions. In this context, the JASSM often assumes a status bordering on sacred, treated as if it were more consequential than the Pontiff himself. However, despite the hype, the JASSM is not a silver bullet capable of decisively destroying the bridge’s core structural components. While it could potentially inflict localized damage—perhaps enough to temporarily halt civilian traffic—the likelihood of delivering a strategic knockout is low without a sustained, well-coordinated strike campaign.
Moreover, the strategic relevance of the bridge has declined over time. In the early stages of the war, Russia heavily relied on the Kerch Bridge for military logistics to Crimea. But since then, alternative land routes have been firmly established, reducing Russia’s dependency on the bridge for moving military assets.

MIKE MIHAJLOVIC-During the early 2000s, some of the most straightforward missions for U.S. B-2 Spirit bomber crews were conducted over Afghanistan, targeting Taliban positions. These operations, though logistically complex, presented minimal combat risk. The Taliban lacked radar systems, surface-to-air missiles, or interceptors, making it virtually impossible for them to detect—let alone counter—the stealth bombers flying high above.

For B-2 crews, the missions were considered routine in tactical terms, with the greatest challenge being the duration of the flights. Bombers often flew nonstop from the continental United States, requiring aerial refueling and round-trip sorties lasting more than 40 hours.

MIKE MIHAJLOVIC—The historical background of the bunker busters’ use in the modern post-WWII conflicts includes the Gulf War & Iraq (1991–2003). Despite heavy use of bunker busters, many Iraqi bunkers survived due to their depth and construction. Some attacks resulted in civilian casualties, raising ethical concerns about the potential for collateral damage.

In Lebanon, bunker busters had mixed success due to complex geology and extensive tunneling.

To date, the MOP has never been used in combat. Simulated tests suggest potential effectiveness, but real-world conditions — weather, terrain, enemy countermeasures — remain unknown.