Nul Points for 28 Points

I remain highly skeptical (1) about Trump’s seriousness about the plan (whatever exactly that plan will turn out to be), since it coincides with US assistance to Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles on targets in Russia, Trump indications of support for a tougher sanctions bill, on top of a Trumpian record for using negotiations as a camouflage for or distractions from planned aggressions; Financial Times reports of the surprising extent to which it claims the US is prepared to go towards Putin’s position of June 2024 actually enhances my suspicions; At a (2) about whether it can be acceptable to Trump’s base - or whatever is left of it when he has finished insulting it - and (3) whether it could ever be acceptable to Zelenskiy or Zelenskiy’s possible upcoming replacement.

But I do remain worried about the Kremlin’s unproductive yearning to achieve a big buddy status with the wholly unworthy Trump Presidency and his army of unrefined neocons. At a time when Russia’s security interests more than ever suggest that Putin’s June 2024 demands are insufficient: that Russia needs Kharkiv, Sumy, Cherniviv, Dnipropretrovsk, Odessa and the Black Sea coastline.

I concede that Russia’s perspective on its own prospects may be less rosy than many of its supporters in the West are inclined to think, precisely because Russia may be less confident than some of its Western supporters as to its prospects once it has won in the East (Donbas) and may feel compelled to move into the West (so as to discourage the west and NATO from attriting Russia from the far side of the Dnieper for the indefinite future), and in so doing confirm the Merz and COW insistence on nefarious Russian designs on Europe and, from that point, actually having to instigate a preemptive direct war with Europe and NATO - who keep saying that they are planning to go to war on Russia in 2029 - ahead of Europe’s schedule.

These are very intelligent and very human doubts. But procrastination may itself be a fatal weakness, and a failure to move now in what may turn out to be a very temporary strategic advantage to Russia and China could set back the entire multipolar project for a generation, perhaps longer, perhaps forever (if the concept '“forever” still has meaning without even more urgent attention to climate change). Some of my readers rightly worry about the clear dangers. I believe there are counter-measures that would in fact discourage US escalation from a point of weakness. We should be thankful, perhaps, that it is not up to us.