Update on Ukraine: Kerch Bridge, Foreign Troops, and much more

Strategic Picture

I have almost nothing to add to the situation in Ukraine since my latest strategic update, except a few little thoughts that I will discuss below. But first, if you have not already read my latest strategic update on Ukraine, see the article here.

Kerch Bridge

The Kerch Bridge (Wiki)

Since the American funds for Ukraine have finally been released, we can expect many surprises in the next months. It was never seriously in doubt that the funds would eventually be released, but it was interesting to learn under what scheme they would push it through. The result was somehow… unspectacular. I expected something more dramatic. But here we are.

Speaker Johnson did a calculation of what would benefit him the most. He waited strategically to leverage the most concessions to him (backdoor concessions…), and when it was most favorable to him, he simply gave in. In the short term, he will now take some hits, but considering the long-term benefits (after a period when the media attention dies down), I’m sure he made a good deal for himself. Maybe he will get a well-paid job somewhere in several years? Or he will be a future presidential candidate? (In many years). Who knows. And it doesn’t matter.

What matters is that he, as an elected representative, should not be looking out for his own benefit but for what is best for America. And considering this, he should have “gone down fighting.” The funds will still be released. No questions about that. But it is about integrity…and saving lives. Remember? The funds (at least the few billion that are assigned to Ukraine) will be used to make sure that the Ukrainian male population dies and the rest of the young Ukrainians will be absorbed (stolen) by the Europeans.

So, nothing unusual or unexpected. Business as usual in politics.

What does this have to do with the Kerch Bridge? A lot. Even though the biggest part of the funds dedicated to Ukraine will be used to pay salaries, bribes, and villas abroad and for fleeing Ukrainian politicians after the collapse, there are still a few surprises.

I assume that the daily consumption of weapons and equipment by the Ukrainian army is not linked to any aid package from anyone. Otherwise, Ukraine would have collapsed long ago. So, the logistics supply chain is running autonomously, mainly sourced by the Americans but also from some European countries that can afford it. The guys from The Duran had a good point, obviously, by suggesting that a fair share of the $61bn would be used to close positions from already delivered weapons in their inventories.

We are talking about:

• Small arms

• Ammunition

• Tanks and IFVs

• Uniforms

• Medical Equipment

• Logistics Equipment

• ATGMs

• Air Defense equipment

• Drones

• Explosives

• And far more

Since the Ukrainians have a very short life span from the moment they are mobilized, one needs to continuously deliver equipment, weapons, and ammunition to all the people kidnapped from the streets and thrown into the battle by force. Most of these weapons won’t be used since these people usually die before they see a Russian soldier.

We are talking about basic equipment for infantry or motorized brigades.

Still, there are some strategically relevant US weapons and equipment, like some types of ATACMS missiles, that the US can’t ship without the knowledge of the American public (or their representatives, who really don’t care about control).

The point is that Ukraine is collapsing now at a considerable pace. There is not much time left to do any critical damage to the Russians before Ukraine goes to Russia. Except for a few things…

Damaging Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure is now a high priority for the West, while possible. For the same reason, the West wants to kill able-bodied Ukrainians and steal the rest of the surviving young Ukrainians (making them refugees after the collapse of Ukraine).

Maybe the Europeans should stop listening to the Woke bullshit they are being fed, which implies that family and kids are undesirable, and instead, they should buy several bottles of wine, lock the bedroom door, and… solve the demographics problems Instead of forcefully incorporating poor young people from warzones where the West initiated the war…

However, these attacks against Russian infrastructure have little to no impact on the war. That’s known to everyone. Listen to the leaked tapes of the Bundeswehr discussing the value of damaging the Kerch Bridge… But it definitely has an impact on Russian resources. That is an economic perspective that needs to be taken into consideration during, and especially after, the war:

• How many resources will Russia be forced to divert (during the war) from the military in order to mitigate the impact on its infrastructure?

And after the war?

• How many resources will Russia be forced to expend to rebuild the parts of Ukraine that will become part of Russia then?

• How many resources will be needed to solve the epic demographic situation after the male population dies or flees, and the youth perhaps disappear into the West and into Russia?

• How many resources will be needed to mitigate the impact of the strikes against Russian infrastructure so that there is no impact on civilians? (eliminating protest potential).

And the most important question of all:

• What could Russia have done with all those resources in a macroeconomic sense instead of simply repairing a capital stock that already existed?

• And what will Russia’s competitors (yes, meaning other BRICS states) be doing at the same time with their resources in the new trade system instead of simply repairing broken stuff?

Even though it will keep the Russian economy very busy for decades and the Russians will be doing well with their domestically focused economy, they will suffer on the international markets compared to their competitors. In fact, their main export goods will remain their natural resources instead of finished goods, at least for the next few decades.

Keep this in mind. It is important. It is not really a significant problem for Russia because Russia is used to it. However, it is an advantage for their competitors in the West (and the East) in terms of securing foreign markets with their own goods made from Russian resources.

However, let’s get to the point: The Kerch Bridge. Is it used for military logistics or not? Is it a military target or not? Can it be destroyed? Will it be destroyed? What are the implications? Let’s discuss these things.

• Is the Kerch Bridge used for military logistics?

  I don’t have specific knowledge, but I would argue that some percentage of the military shipments to Crimea use this route. Logistics is a complicated subject, especially during wartime. From my point of view, it would be irresponsible not to use this route as long as it is available for all shipments, including military goods.

  Remember the discussion about whether Russia receives weapons and ammunition from North Korea, Iran, and China? I have written from the beginning of this blog that it is a certainty that Russia DOES receive supplies from its allies. Even though others argued that Russia is the sole ultra power of this planet and can handle everything on its own, no, it can’t. This is war, and you must use every available leverage over your enemy; otherwise, it translates into defeat or high casualties.

  The same goes with the Kerch Bridge. Even though I don’t know, I’m sure that it still is being used for some military goods.

  Here is the next point: Russia has a serious naval logistics problem. Even before the war, it was critical, for example, for supplying its Syrian bases by sea. It took Russia several years until it was able to supply Tartus and Khmeimim with its own military capabilities. For some time, it relied on chartered Russian and even Turkish civilian cargo ships. The problem was solved eventually.

  Everyone is focusing on how many tanks, submarines, or frigates Russia produces. No one ever asked about how many auxiliary and logistics assets/equipment Russia produces to maintain the operability of these weapons.

  To be clear, I believe Russia is meeting its goals for supply. But we need to keep in mind that Russia’s capabilities for doing that are determined by the available logistics infrastructure.

  Why do I write this? Because the means to supply a peninsula with five million citizens and a large military garrison is incredibly difficult. Especially during wartime. There are means to do it. From 2014, prior to the opening of the Kerch Bridge, it was accomplished by air and ferries. But now we have war. Almost all logistics assets, including naval assets, are bottlenecks.

  All the Ukrainian, seemingly senseless, attacks against “old” Russian landing ships, etc., always had a purpose. Many argued that an old Russian ship that was due for scrapping was sunk when such an event took place. But that is not accurate. These are not battleships but can be considered armored cargo ships. Their purpose is to transport goods from A to B. Even very old ships can fill this purpose.

  I was the Head of Logistics for an international company for some time, that’s why I always keep my focus on logistics and not on propaganda. Russia is short of naval supply vessels. It was unnecessary in the past since there was no need for power projection. Operations like in Syria wouldn’t have been needed at all had there been no plans by the West to subjugate the world… But here we are.

  The best example of this is the rescue ship Kommuna of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It was built 1912 and it is still in service since it meets its purpose. Why scrap or replace it, then? It is the Western mentality to replace a car after the first scratch appears. Ignoring that the car is still fulfilling its purpose (I’m exaggerating). However, this ship also was attacked. A ship from 1912. Of course, it was attacked; I would do the same. It has an important purpose, and if it were sunk, the Russians would need to invest funds and devote resources of a shipyard to replace this lost capability to do XYZ.

  I’m coming slowly but steadily to a conclusion: What “Ukraine” is doing in the Black Sea, be it against the Black Sea Fleet or against Crimea has nothing to do with Ukraine’s “interests” or the war in Ukraine. These are solely NATO operations to cripple Russia’s Black Sea Fleet capabilities.

  So, yes, Russia should and most likely IS still supplying Crimea by the Kerch Bridge. Still, I would argue that it is for the purpose of risk management. It is to be expected that logistics over this bridge will be interrupted, so it would be madness to rely heavily on this bridge. I would argue (from experience) that we should expect a level of sourcing of 20% by the Kerch Bridge.

• Is it a military target?

  So, is the Kerch Bridge a military target? Yes, and an important one indeed. I’ll explain later in more depth, but for starters, think about the cargo volume (civilian and military) and civilians traveling between Krasnodar and Crimea daily/weekly/monthly. Roughly five million people need to be supplied. Disrupting this logistics artery for an extended period during wartime and during the holiday season would be disastrous. Everyone focuses on the question of whether it would influence the war or its outcome. Fine, but what about the people living in Crimea?

  Don’t get me wrong here. I’m sure that contingencies have been in place since the beginning of the war, for example, through the Donetsk and Kherson regions and by ferries (which are scarce). However, these routes are vulnerable since they are going through a war zone. You can’t transport civilians by these routes due to the danger of attack.

  What is my point? Simple: If this route breaks it would put an enormous strain on military logistics to keep Crimea supplied. In other words, Routes like the new railway route by land would need to handle both military logistics and civilian logistics simultaneously. Impossible? No, of course not. But there is a nice (rather not?) English word that I learned during a project in Birmingham, England, to describe the situation: Pain in the ass.

  As everyone argues, it surely will not change the outcome of the war. But it is, in fact, the only means for the West to cause real and palpable pain to Russian logistics. There are no other means to achieve a similar effect.

• Can it be destroyed?

  During this war, we have learned a lot about the destructive capabilities of missiles, particularly regarding the destruction of infrastructure and the capabilities of air defenses. Not only in Ukraine but in the Middle East as well. To be fair, the theoretical capabilities of both Russian and Western air defense assets did not match the actual results seen on the battlefield. And that makes sense. In ideal environments, you always achieve better results than on the battlefield especially if your opponents are working together to find and exploit your weaknesses.

  So, yes, if the West wants it, then hits on the Kerch Bridge will be accomplished.

  Can it be destroyed? No, it cannot. The weapons available to Ukraine can’t destroy the pillars. If multiple ATACMS missiles hit one pillar at the same time, they could. But this scenario is almost impossible, given the air defense efforts around the bridge and the limited accuracy of the missiles.

  It is almost certain that, in the case of a mass attack, one or more of the road spans and/or railway tracks would be damaged or destroyed. This could cause an interruption of several weeks or months, depending on how many spans and/or tracks were destroyed.

  What is meant by the West when it says, “Destroy the bridge.” Make it entirely sink? That would be very difficult even without air defense, and you would need to plant tons of explosives on many pillars to make the structure itself collapse. With these missiles—impossible.

  So, when the West talks about destroying the Kerch Bridge, it essentially means disrupting logistics for a certain period.

• Will it be destroyed?

  There is a finite probability that logistics over the Kerch Bridge will be interrupted for a period of time. Is it certain to happen? I don’t know. However, it would not change the outcome or the direction of the war. It would only be, as explained before, a “Pain in the ass”.

• What are the implications?

  Why is southern logistics so important for Russia? Why are these ATACMS missiles coming now and not earlier? The Southern front is calm. Is the southern military supply route important at all?

  For now, it is less important than other areas of the war zone. The fact that the West is escalating efforts to destroy it now tells me one thing: Intelligence is in place that Ukrainian front lines and defenses on the east side of the Dnieper are going to collapse within the next few months, and Ukraine might be forced to withdraw across the Dnieper. At this point, southern logistics might become important again, depending on the ability of the Ukrainians to resist across the Dnieper in Zaporizhia and Kherson at the same time when Russia is rolling up the front lines in the north.

  Honestly, I don’t know. But, seeing emphasis put on the southern logistics route by the West, I’d say this is directly connected to a potential advance on Odessa.

  Don’t get me wrong. I don’t expect at ANY time that Russia will be approaching Odessa fighting. The Ukrainian Army will be gone BEFORE Russia reaches Odessa. Except for one possible event: If some chickens (Westerners) appear in Odessa. This might have catastrophic consequences, but I already wrote about that.

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F16s

There is also talk about the imminent appearance of F16s in Ukraine. Since the Soviet planes that were available have already been supplied and almost all have been shot down, there was a need to bolster the fleet with new aircraft. The F16 makes a lot of sense because it is available in large numbers and it can carry the most important missiles. Trained pilots are also plentiful.

Due to inflation and multiple improvements to the aircraft, the price of an F-16 rose from around $15 million in 1998 to about $30-35 million by 2017. Now the price hovers around $63 million. (USAF)

It is not about survivability in a dogfight. It is simply to keep a platform in the air that can periodically strike targets behind Russia’s lines to cause some pain. Not to change anything but to cause some pain by attacking those targets that are not well-defended. It also boosts Ukrainian morale by maintaining the perception that they still have an active Air Force and are hitting Russian targets.

I think the question is not whether they will operate from Ukrainian soil or from NATO soil. Or whether NATO pilots will fly them or Ukrainians. It simply doesn’t matter as long these planes are operating in Ukraine and don’t attack the Black Sea Fleet or old Russian territory. The vectors of approach are also relevant. Will they approach directly from Romania, flying over the Black Sea? I don’t think this would be tolerated.

And what about the pilots? There is always the discussion about what planes Ukrainian pilots can fly and whether they can learn to fly NATO planes since they are used to flying only Soviet designs. Okay? Which Ukrainian pilots? Almost all of them turned already into ghosts of Kiev.

There is credible information that the Ukrainians sent a few guys with no motivation and education to the West to learn to fly F16s. The West is not even confident whether these guys will ever be capable of flying an F16. And if so, only after another year.

Who will fly these planes then, IF they appear? Of course: NATO mercenaries! Also, there is an almost unlimited supply of these planes. I think the babbling about the Dutch F16s, etc., is only a distraction. Yes, maybe they will be delivered, or maybe not. But there are more than enough available to make them vanish without account.

So, yes. They will possibly appear and continue what the Soviet planes did before. Maybe, slightly more effectively since they will be Western pilots with Western planes and Western missiles. So, maybe one or another missile will get through and destroy XYZ. And then, after using it for practice to calibrate Russian air defense algorithms, they will become targets for the turkey shoot again.

There is another aspect. Russia could soon start to advance deeply in the Dnieper direction and beyond. These troops will become more vulnerable to air-to-surface missiles since they will be mainly protected by short-range air means, which will not be calibrated to the new threat at first. Note: No one will use S-400 missiles to shoot down air-launched missiles against troops… Yes, that is a little sad but it is reality. Still, the missile carrier (the plane) definitely could receive a welcome gift from an S-400 battery.

Dnieper Bridges

Since the beginning, there has always been the question of why the Dnieper bridges are still standing. I answered that question very early on. You can read it from the beginning of BMA. It was always in Russia’s favor to fight the Ukrainian army on the East Side of the Dnieper instead of on the West Side. Why?

• Friendly population

• Short Supply Lines

• Bordering with (old) Russia

• Establishes Supply Lines

• Strategic and Operational long-range air defense

• Less need for Logistics Equipment

The absolute opposite applies to the Ukrainians.

Recently, rumors have circulated “explaining” why Russia hasn’t destroyed the bridges:

• Asset for negotiations

  I don’t think so.

• Red lines by the West

  I don’t think so.

• No means to destroy it

  It is a challenge to destroy the major bridges over the Dnieper, especially from a distance. If one hits only the spans, they can certainly be restored repeatedly, for military purposes. We saw that with the Antonivskyi bridge in Kherson. It was penetrated daily like Swiss cheese, and after a day or two, it was operational again for Russian military transport.

  So, to destroy a bridge in a way that you can’t restore it quickly, the pillars need to be destroyed, and therefore, you need a missile/rocket with a lot of explosive energy or with a lot of kinetic energy to penetrate the pillars.

  Of course, this does not apply to every kind of bridge architecture, but a lot of the Dnieper Bridges were constructed in the Soviet way with military and civil dual-purpose considerations.

  So, yes – it is a challenge to destroy the Dnieper bridges. But it is possible. Especially since we can assume that the production of Kinzhals has been ramped up. I think they would be the best way to penetrate the Bridge Pillars effectively.

  Still, these are scarce resources, and Russia will use them only on these Bridges after a strategic decision by the top leadership.

• Waiting for the right moment to destroy them

  I would argue that it would make sense to preserve these Bridges for after the war, since this will be Russia. And for Russian Army logistics for operations on the West side of the Dnieper IF needed. All of this will then be Russia, and these bridges will need to be restored, which is resource-intensive.

  Nevertheless, I think that these bridges will be destroyed by the Ukrainians themselves anyway when they withdraw to the West side of the Dnieper, so this consideration doesn’t make sense at all.

  Hence, there is still the possibility that Russia will delay the destruction until most of the Ukrainian army troops and equipment are on the east side. In other words, when the number of reinforcements is dwindling. Then Russia can isolate the whole grouping of Ukrainian forces on the east side from safety on the west side without the possibility of reinforcement or withdrawal.

  This might occur within the next few weeks or months.

  Will it happen? I don’t know; I’m still a little skeptical. We will see.

However, destroying the Dnieper bridges could be just one escalation step of many by the Russians. Some are tactical and will be done in response to escalation by Ukraine (the West). However, it is not very wise to escalate against Russia from a Ukrainian perspective. Since the West controls the playbook for Ukraine, their decisions are not to be measured by whether they are in Ukraine’s interest but whether they are in the West’s interest. And, again, everything that damages Russia or Ukraine (will be Russia again) is good. So, the West will continue the escalation.

Chasov Yar and Ocheretino

Russia has been targeting and slowly grinding down the best-defended Ukrainian frontline cities from the start of the SMO, instead of bypassing them through less defendable territories. This was the sole reason for forcing the Ukrainians to commit their best troops in such “meatgrinders” to attract them in the fastest possible way. The main stronghold for the Ukrainians in the Donbass region is currently Chasov Yar. If it falls, Russia has access to Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, which would be the last stand for Ukraine in the Donetsk region.

Ukraine is forced to commit everything possible to hold Chasov Yar, which is favorable to Russia. The remaining Ukrainian forces can be destroyed in one place. Russia plans its logistics around such meatgrinders to enable the best possible means of destroying everything inside such meatgrinder.

What does that mean?

• Russian Air Defense and Electronic Warfare means are in place to protect the forward units from everything that flies on the frontlines. We can assume that Ukraine is concentrating some elite forces for battle in these places. So, everything should be done to protect Russia’s forward units against these possible threats.

• Russia is concentrating its own air force assets (FABs?) and drone forces at such meatgrinders.

• Russia is concentrating its artillery forces at such places.

• Russia is also concentrating its reconnaissance means in such places.

• In other words, Everything that is needed to protect its own forward troops and to inflict maximum damage on the enemy troops within the meat grinder to make it as effective as possible. Effectiveness is, of course, measured by the number of degraded enemy forces per period of time.

Now, is Chasov Yar a meatgrinder? I’d like to discuss this a little deeper.

First, let’s take a look at a map:

Kerch Bridge—TGP Screenshot

Source: https://ukraine.liveuamap.com/with own illustrations

If Ukraine is fully committed to holding Chasov Yar by all means, then the current Russian approach is insufficient to take the town. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying that Russia is doing this or that wrong. I’m not qualified to say that. I’m only saying it won’t be sufficient to take the town by going right through the front door especially because the garrison can be supplied, for the time being, by multiple routes freely. It would be too costly to Russia.

I personally think that this is not even the Russian intention. I think Russia is going to take a foothold within Chasov Yar. And then develop the flanks to create larger wedges from the north and the south, which would enable Russia to create step-by-step another large meatgrinder with the potential of thousands or tens of thousands of Ukrainian casualties, before attempting to take the town. I drew my thoughts about how the flanks would need to be developed to create another meatgrinder for the purpose of destroying the Ukrainian Army.

Provided that there is intelligence in place, that Ukraine is lacking the strength the manpower to hold Chasov Yar at all, the plan could be to take the town directly without creating a meat grinder. Both are possible, but I’m rather inclined to support the scenario of creating another meat grinder. Especially after reports appeared that foreign legion troops could be deployed in Chasov Yar, it would be a great place from a Russian perspective to bury them there without moving in.

Is it necessary to take Chasov Yar by force at all? Maybe not. This leads me to the next topic. Ocheretino. In 2022, during the Russian operation to free the Lugansk People’s Republic, Russia managed to break through the Ukrainian lines and take a town on an important height, Popasnaya. And from this town, which was now behind Ukrainian lines, the Russian troops advanced in all directions, which resembled a blooming flower if viewed on a map.

The same applies now to Ocheretino. It also is on an important height and behind the Ukrainian lines. And this town fell. After it fell, Russia again started to advance in all directions, starting from Ocheretino behind the straight Ukrainian lines.

What is the implication of this? First, the length of the front line is now stretched by an order of magnitude. And there are another few such flowers in the making everywhere on the front lines from Kharkiv down to Zaporozhia. Every such flower will stretch the Ukrainian front lines and, by doing this, the demand for personnel to hold back the Russians.

And what resource is Ukraine lacking the most? Personnel. People.

The Russian forces can advance now in less-defended territory behind the Ukrainian main lines, complicating Ukraine’s defense far more.

All of what I just wrote now translates into one certain threat: Collapse.

I have no idea how many troops Ukraine has left, how many they can forcefully mobilize, or how many foreign legion mercenaries will be sent to the place to keep the lines from collapsing. But the question is not IF but WHEN. When will these facts lead to a total collapse of the Ukrainian forces on the east side of the Dnieper?

Again:

• There is another meatgrinder in the making with the potential of eating tens of thousands of Ukrainians IF created.

• The frontlines are being penetrated everywhere, and wedges, which translate into “flowers,” are being created everywhere. Which demands even more human resources to stabilize the front lines.

All of this raises the question of whether Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, etc., will need to be taken by force at all or will the Ukrainian forces on the east side of the Dnieper collapse earlier with a subsequent withdrawal to the west side of the Dnieper?

I have no answer for this but it makes sense to think these questions through.

I’m still curious whether we will see another vector of pressure in Kharkov and Sumy, from the Russian border. We’ll see.

Foreign Troops

There are ever more discussions and even indications that foreign troops might actually be deployed in Ukraine. Not just somewhere in Ukraine but directly in Chasov Yar. Is it true or not? Maybe. It doesn’t matter. We can say that roughly 1,000 additional troops (Ukrainian or Foreign) translate into 0.8-day prolonging of the war.

An example: 15,000 French troops (which I still doubt, except the foreign legion, which are mercenaries) translates into the prolonging of the war for = 15,000 x 0.8 = 12 days. The French would be gone (dead/wounded) in 12 days.

Okay, as long they do not set foot in Odessa. Then the Eifel Tower could be turned upside down suddenly…literally. All information is in place.

Before someone asks, 12 days prolongation of the war means 12 days prolongation of the war and not that when the French troops enter Ukraine, all of them would be dead after 12 days. There are a million questions to determine when and where they would fall. Would they be held in the rear to free up 15,000 Ukrainians? Then they would live a little longer and die step by step by constant drone and missile terror?

Would they be deployed to Chasov Yar? (Nonsense, it is not even logistically possible). Then, they would die within 12 days. Between this black-and-white scenario are many shades of grey.

So, I do not think so much about this Macronian nonsense. After all, I also believe that this whole operation was set up by Western Oligarchs as an operation to nudge the Germans ever more to “do something.” Which translates into “committing suicide.” But we will see.

Nuclear Weapons Drills

Odessa MUST NOT BE TOUCHED by any foreign troops. To highlight this fact in backchannels more information is trickling out. There are indications that Russia might start training with non-strategic (tactical?) nuclear weapons. Most likely, we are talking about command-level training and/or actual live-fire training with dummy weapons. I don’t know. But it is the clearest sign that everybody who touches Russian cities currently occupied by Ukraine, which are being marked as strategic (ODESA!!!!!!), will die. Not only the soldiers themselves but the leaders who gave the orders as well. I maintain my assessment from my previous article that I don’t expect such a scenario (10%).

Still, we could see a lot of Western mercenaries dying on the frontlines while trying to stabilize the collapsing front lines. But this doesn’t matter. Remember: 1,000 people = 0.8 days.

[i] Edited by Piquet (EditPiquet@gmail.com)