Keystone Cops Don’t Shoot Straight and Kurds Are Not (Always) Suicidal (UpDate 1)

A former Marine major, an interlocutor on a recent TWT panel, struck me as unusually and a little over-persistently insistent that the US was never ever going to run out of missiles or anything else. I held back from countering this because I was not sure whether he had access to recent, privileged information, and he had made it sound as though he did.

His confidence seemed highly unlikely to be well founded on the face of it, given (1) how extraordinarily expensive anything ever made by the US defense industry always is by comparison with the weapons production facilities of its enemies (which is why Russia and China enjoy very important cost advantages); (2) by the experience earlier on in the war in Ukraine of dire shortages within the political West of the essential 155mm shells and, later, of Patriot launchers and interceptors, but also (3) because of the increasing evidence from the Gulf that countries there are running low on Patriot and other interceptors (not least – surprise, surprise – because so many of these have been sent to, abused and exhausted in Ukraine, whose Presidente Zelenskiy is now complaining that the US never loved Ukraine as it now appears to love the Gulf countries).

The sting power of US missile attacks on Iran, while enormous, destructive and, as when civilians are the target, Gaza-like cruel, is also limited, as we are learning today from an interview between Dan Davis and MIT rocket expert Ted Postol who noticed for the first time as he watched footage Davis showing him of an Iranian missile being launched from the desert that the launch site was covered by a layer of dirt so that prior to launch it had been entirely invisible from the air. This immediately rubbishes claims from the US that it has taken out half of Iran’s missile launchers. The US claim cannot be true because the US surely does not know how many launchers there are in the first place, nor where they are located.

Iranian Scud missile launcher

And in the meantime, both the Gulf and Israel are experiencing very heavy missile showers: of these, it is very interesting that, according to Davis and Postol, the missiles do appear to be fairly old, some of them disintegrating on approaching their targets. And yet, the missile clusters pouring over Israel also include the Golden-Dome-busting variety.

All this confirms (1) Iranian claims that Iran is sitting on its newer, more advanced projectiles until a later stage in the war; (2) the intercept rate against Iranian drones is very low; and (3) the Gulf appears not simply denuded of air defenses but whatever air defenses they are using are either technically of low quality or are not being skilfully applied: many appear to be hopelessly off-target. And (4), decoys are also being deployed, which induce a huge wastage of interceptors. Sometimes, eight interceptors will be wasted on one incoming projectile. Israelis have only a one in 20 chance of choosing the real missile when it is only one among a shower of 20 of which 19 are decoys. The first 36 hours of the war alone consumed over 3,000 US-Israeli munitions.

The US claims it has a 90% success rates in interceptor hits. Throughout his career, Postol has demonstrated time and time again that effectively rubbished such claims. He cites one Stanford University source (publishing in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, whose Board, Postol points out, is not made up entirely of atomic scientists with relevant military experience, and does not submit its articles to peer review) that claims an 87% success rate for the Israeli Golden Dome. Postol puts it closer to 5%.

(Note: the Bulletin itself says that it is not a peer-reviewed journal, but that it does send unsolicited articles to colleagues for outside review).

Postol points out that the Israeli Dome interceptors are not always travelling at sufficient speed to take down the missiles they are chasing. Further it is relatively easy using iridium communication systems to guide drones to targets. Half a dozen drones, each carrying a couple of hundred pounds of explosive, can be launched from a single launcher and each can have significant impact on buildings.

In these circumstances, Israel will run out of interceptors in no time. And, of course, so will all other Gulf countries that host US military installations whose presence has always been intended to harass and intimidate Iran.

From other sources, we learn that the US air presence over Iran is less than previously boasted by the US, and that US-Israeli flights directly over Iranian territory are probably far fewer than we have been led to believe so far. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that Iran has extensively targeted US radar across the region, with a notable hit on a major radar facility in Qatar and that this Iranian capacity for hits on radar is probably helped enormously by the provision of satellite data from China and, quite possibly, Russia, whose other forms of help are thought to be continuing. The downgrading of US radar will complicate US efforts to monitor what is happening on the borders (as in the case of its hoped-for Iraqi-Kurd invasion – see below) and any assistance coming in from Russia or China. The Hegseth-promised arrival of US gravity-bombs is not so close as was indicated by Hegseth a day or so ago.

Iranian foreign minister Abbas Arghchi has indicated that there have been attempted mediation efforts although we dont know by whom; US President Trump has categorically insisted on TruthSocial that the war must continue until Iran surrenders unconditionally, and has even said that it is he who must decide who will be Iran’s next leader (!) even as Iran’s selection committee is apparently still determining who should replace Khamenei.

The US sinking earlier this week, by submarine torpedo, of Iranian battleship Iris Denia was a strike on a ship participating by invitation from India in naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and about 2,000 kilometers from Iran, a ship that Iranian foreign minister Araghchi said was unarmed. The sinking may constitute a war crime in any universe in which there still exists an international legal system capable of making such judgments. The US made no attempt to rescue the 100+ sailors thrown into the sea (whereas in World War Two, Germany typically would attempt to rescue such victims in comparable circumstances). The US failure contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

Iran is likely very unhappy with Modi’s failure to condemn the sinking alongside the alacrity with which India has seized on a temporary lifting of US sanctions on Indian imports of Russian oil and gas in recognition of Indian dependence on the flow of energy products through the Strait of Hormuz.

In the meantime, Asian buyers of oil – busily negotiating emergency supply arrangements – are reportedly outbidding European in the wake, especially, of the closure of Qatari LNG production (something which will take weeks to recover even if the war ends today, and much longer in the event the war continues for several weeks more). These countries are already looking into force majuere clauses that could relieve them of their pathetic promises to invest $billions in the US in return for lower TTT (Trump Terror Tariffs). Worries are growing in Washington that the crisis reduces the capacity of Taiwan to resist a Chinese invasion. Brent Crude is selling at nearly $90 a barrel and it is anticipated it could rise to as much as $200 after a period of prolonged disruption.

The US has engaged much boasting about its hits on various Iranian warships; its critics argue that the most important components of the Iranian navy are not warships but a fleet of much smaller, faster, more flexible craft.

The US is spending $1 billion a day on the current operation in the Gulf; if the US is now contemplating an engagement of 100 days, then it is looking to a cost of $100 billion, not mentioning other ways in which the US and its allies will suffer unplanned costs. The US reputation as the Gulf’s “protector,” and, therefore the Gulf’s reputation as a suitable middleman in global trade, has already been shot to bits. More money for the US war of choice will require additional appropriations (the figure of $50 billion is being canvassed) passed by Congress, a process that will likely give rise to far more discordance – as the country moves closer to the November mid-term elections – than that which met the Democrats’ failed attempt this week to call a vote on whether a war powers bill would be introduced.

The consequences for the Ukraine war are significant given that Russia will benefit very considerably from higher prices for its oil and gas, and Ukraine will suffer not only from having to pay yet more for energy, but from the fact that Hungary and Slovakia are breaking away even more extremely from the EU in retaliation for Ukraine’s and the EU’s failure to restore passage to them of Russian oil across Ukraine and in retaliation for Zelenskiy’s angry threats against them (especially as Ukrainian meddling in Hungary could help unseat Orban in upcoming elections), something which has prompted visions in Hungary and Slovakia of a war against Ukraine.

Kurds

Below is a clear, evidence‑based overview of what is publicly reported about anti‑Iranian Kurdish uprisings or insurgent activity in Iran and Iraq, based strictly on the sources retrieved.

Evidence of Anti‑Iranian Kurdish Uprising Inside Iran:

Kurds In Iran

Multiple sources describe an ongoing Kurdish rebellion beginning January 2026, involving Iranian Kurdish political parties and armed groups:

• Iranian Kurdish parties declared a general strike during the 2025–2026 Iranian protests.

• Limited insurgent operations were carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).

• In February 2026, several Kurdish parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, calling for the overthrow of the Iranian regimeduring the 2026 Iran war.

• Fighting and political activity occurred in Eastern Kurdistan (Iran) with spillover into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

This constitutes the clearest documented evidence of an active Kurdish uprising against Iran.

Kurds in Iraq

While Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is not itself rebelling against Iran, it is repeatedly described as:

• A base of operations for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups (e.g., PJAK, PAK, Komala).

• A staging ground for cross‑border insurgent activity into Iran.

• A location where Kurdish fighters train and mobilize for operations targeting Iranian forces.

Thus, the evidence points to Iraqi Kurdish territory being used as a rear base, not an uprising against Iraq, but rather anti‑Iranian Kurdish militancy operating from Iraq.

(Additional non-AI note): Middle East Monitor reports that the leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani has told Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, that the region will NOT join in any operation against Iran. Whether much weight can be given to his assurances is moot, but there is significant doubt that there is appetite among Kurds in Iran to facilitate an operation launched from their ethnic brothers in Iraq. Some sources suggest that a fighting force might amount to up to 1,500 militiamen, a number that seems far too slight to make much more than a dent against Iranian forces that number one million – assuming, that is, that there are no significant defections of Iranian army unit, as happened under quite different circumsatances in Syria, but this does not presently seem likely). Any development of a major Kurdish force will be strongly opposed by Turkey’s Erdogan who has the power to make life very uncomfortable to Kurdish forces throughout the region. The Iraqi government will also be opposed. So too will be Russia which in the past has maintained fairly good relations with the Kurds).

External Involvement: Reports of U.S. Support

Several sources report alleged U.S. (CIA) efforts to arm Kurdish groups to spark or intensify an uprising against Iran:

• CNN‑linked reporting claims the CIA is arming Kurdish forces to foment a popular uprising in Iran.

• Al Jazeera reports U.S. discussions with Kurdish opposition groups to support an uprising.

• Additional reporting states the CIA is supplying Kurdish militias in Iraq to incite rebellion against Iran’s regime.

• U.S. efforts reportedly aim to tie down Iranian forces along the border and enable unrest in Iranian cities.

These reports do not themselves prove an uprising, but they indicate external attempts to encourage or strengthen one

Summary:

Confirmed

• Active Kurdish insurgency/uprising inside Iran beginning in early 2026.

• Iranian Kurdish armed groups conducting operations against Iranian security forces.

• Iraqi Kurdistan used as a staging area for anti‑Iranian Kurdish groups.

• Multiple reports of U.S. intelligence support to Kurdish groups with the explicit goal of sparking or expanding an uprising.

Not evidenced:

• A Kurdish uprising against Iraq itself.

• A unified, large‑scale Kurdish rebellion across both countries—rather, the activity is Iran‑focused, with Iraq serving as a logistical base.

Here’s a clear, evidence‑based synthesis of what publicly available sources report about anti‑Iranian Kurdish uprisings or insurgent activity in Iran and Iraq, grounded directly in the search results you approved.

Evidence of an Anti‑Iranian Kurdish Uprising Inside Iran

1. The 2026 Kurdish Rebellion in Iran (Ongoing)

The strongest documented evidence of an active uprising comes from the 2026 Kurdish rebellion, which multiple sources describe as a real, ongoing insurgency:

• Start date: 5 January 2026

• Location: Eastern Kurdistan (Iran) with spillover into Iraqi Kurdistan

• Key events:

  • Iranian Kurdish parties declared a general strike during the 2025–2026 Iranian protests.

  • The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) conducted limited insurgent operations.

  • On 22 February 2026, several Kurdish parties formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, explicitly calling for the overthrow of the Iranian regime during the 2026 Iran war.

• Status: Ongoing armed and political rebellion.

This is the clearest, most direct evidence of an anti‑Iranian Kurdish uprising.

Evidence of Anti‑Iranian Kurdish Activity In Iraq

There is no evidence of a Kurdish uprising against Iraq.
However, Iraqi Kurdistan is repeatedly described as a rear base for Iranian Kurdish groups:

• Kurdish fighters (e.g., PAK, PJAK, Komala) operate from camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

• These groups use Iraqi territory for training, mobilization, and cross‑border operations into Iran.

• Photos and reporting show Iranian Kurdish fighters near the Iran–Iraq border in Iraqi