Julian Macfarlane • News Forensics

Today’s post for coffee buyers is on Medvedev, who often speaks for Putin and expresses the public mood.

Last night, in an article for coffee buyers I wrote about Iran’s contribution to the new field of asymmetric warfare and Russia’s learning curve. Russia started behind that curve, as far as drones were concerned, and Iran helped .
Now, it is a drone power-house— which Europe and the UK should consider. Russia has the means to win a war with NATO without having to turn Europe into a radioactive wasteland.
Long-Range Strike (OWA-UAVs):
Geran-2 (Shahed-136): The primary long-range, low-cost “kamikaze” drone, with AI-enabled versions and jet-powered variants (Geran-4/5) being deployed.
Geran-1 (Shahed-131): Smaller version of the Geran-2 used for tactical strikes.
Gerbera: A newer, cheaper, and slightly faster variant often used for reconnaissance or to serve as a decoy to exhaust Ukrainian air defense.
Italmas (BM-35): A long-range strike drone often used in mixed, multi-type strike packages.
Garpiya-A1: A long-range, strike drone produced in Russia.
Tactical Reconnaissance/Surveillance:
Orlan-10: The workhorse for tactical surveillance and target acquisition.
Supercam: Used for battlefield reconnaissance.
Merlin-VR: A reconnaissance drone.
ZALA 421 Series: Various models (421-08, 421-16) for battlefield intelligence.
Shtorm: A newer reconnaissance UAV designed to be difficult to detect.
Loitering Munitions (Kamikaze):
Lancet: Highly effective, AI-capable loitering munition used for precision strikes on high-value targets (artillery, armor).
Kub-BLA: A smaller loitering munition.
Bolt: A new, automated interceptor drone designed for the “Ploshchad-PVO” air defense network to shoot down other drones.

Specialized/Experimental:
Fiber-Optic FPVs: A growing category that transmits signals via cable, making them immune to electronic jamming.
Armed Geran-2/4: Late-model Gerans equipped with R-60 air-to-air missiles to attack aircraft.
Quantities and Production Capacity (2026)

Russia has heavily invested in domestic production and is, as of 2026, surpassing its initial 2025 targets, with plans to produce 7 million FPV drones in 2026.
Massive Production Scale: By 2026, Russia has moved from importing to a high-capacity producer, with reports of over 100,000 personnel in dedicated unmanned units.
Daily Launch Rates: In March 2026, Russia launched an average of over 200 drones per day. In April 2026, 6,583 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs were launched, exceeding 4,000+ daily production estimates by late 2025.
Specific Model Output: As of early 2026, Russia was producing an estimated 404 Shahed-type drones daily (roughly 12,000 per month) and aimed to surge toward 1,000 units per day
Recent Technological Shifts
Fiber-Optic Drones: To counter electronic warfare (EW), Russia has begun mass-deploying FPV drones controlled via fiber-optic cables, making them immune to signal jamming.
Jet-Powered Variants: New models like the Geran-3 (Shahed-238) use jet engines for higher speeds, though they are currently produced in smaller quantities than propeller-driven models.
AI & Autonomy: Experimental units like the Rubicon unit are testing fully autonomous swarms and AI-controlled navigation to bypass jamming completely
It is also the world-leader in anti-drone defense systems.
Russia’s drone arsenal has evolved into a massive, multi-tiered fleet characterized by rapid domestic production no longer dependent on Iranian technology.
As of May 2026, Russia operates dozens of specialized military drone types and has scaled production into the millions.
Total Fleet & Production Scale
Total Inventory: While exact stockpiles fluctuate daily due to combat use, Russia produced approximately 1.4 million drones in 2024 and aimed to increase this to 1.8–2 million by 2025/2026.
Daily Production Rate: Estimates suggest Russia can produce nearly 4,000 drones daily across all categories, including roughly 170–500 Shahed-type strike drones every 24 hours.
Recent Technological Shifts
Fiber-Optic Drones: To counter electronic warfare (EW), Russia has begun mass-deploying FPV drones controlled via fiber-optic cables, making them immune to signal jamming.
Jet-Powered Variants: New models like the Geran-3 (Shahed-238) use jet engines for higher speeds, though they are currently produced in smaller quantities than propeller-driven models.
AI & Autonomy: Experimental units like the Rubicon unit are testing fully autonomous swarms and AI-controlled navigation to bypass jamming completely.
As of May 2026, Russia’s anti-drone strategy has shifted from relying on traditional air defenses to a multi-layered “electronic dome” approach, combining high-end missile systems with thousands of small-scale jammers and interceptor drones.
.Strategic and Point Air Defense
Pantsir-S1/SM: The “backbone” of drone defense. To counter drone swarms, newer variants like the Pantsir-SMD-E can carry up to 48 mini-missiles instead of the standard 12, specifically to avoid wasting expensive full-sized missiles on cheap drones.
Tor-M2: Recently upgraded with 360-degree jamming modules to disrupt FPV drones within a 500-meter radius while still tracking larger targets.
Krona: A newer short-range system currently entering service, designed as a dedicated networked “sensor-to-shooter” solution for low-altitude threats.

Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems
Mobile Jammers (SERP-FPV): Introduced in May 2026, these vehicle-mounted units provide immediate 360-degree protection for moving armored columns against FPV attacks.
Area Denial (Krasukha & Repellent-1): Large truck-mounted systems that can suppress drone control and GPS signals over 30–35 km.
Trench-Level Defense (Volnorez & Rubezh): Thousands of “portable domes” have been distributed to infantry units. These create localized interference bubbles to protect individual tanks or trenches from FPV “kamikaze” drones.
Dedicated Interceptors & Exotic Weapons
Russia has begun deploying “drone vs. drone” technologies to preserve expensive missile stockpiles.
Yolka Interceptor: An AI-driven, “fire-and-forget” drone that uses kinetic impact (ramming) to down enemy UAVs. It was officially deployed in May 2025.
Stribog “Mothership”: A concept recently showcased that carries multiple smaller interceptor drones or net-deploying units to engage swarms.
Laser Systems (Posokh/Peresvet): Russia officially claimed the deployment of laser weapons for attacks on satellites and also drones.
Russia continues to cooperate with Iran in this area and is learning a great deal from Iran’s war with the US, which it can apply to its own situation.
One developing area is asymmetric naval warfare. For example, Russian commentators have been suggesting Russia copy Iran’s use of small boats or catamarans to police Hormuz.
However, the Baltics and Black Sea offer different challenges. Iran’s small boat strategy involves swarms of manned boats, many of whose crews are willing to become martyrs -- but Russia wants to reduce casualties to a minimum.

Iran’s strategy envisages conflict with conventional naval forces, specifically US carriers and destroyers.
In the Black Sea, Russia must cope with Ukrainian aerial drones and missiles aswell as a variety of naval drones.

In the Baltics, there is no real confrontation — only the threat of it, should there be a war—in which case it would be NATO destroyers and submarines which would likely be taken out from the air, as was the case with Iran’s Souleimani Corvettes.
So Russia must approach the challenges from a different perspective, paying attention to the Iranian experience..
It itself is increasingly using naval drones. but with drones, missiles – and heavily armed corvettes .
Fast boats might seem like an advantage because of their speed but they are short on range and usually used in swarms.
Too Dangerous! Iran's Navy speedboats equipped with powerful radar evading stealth technology
As far as military technologies are concerned, context is important. Adaptability and innovation are primary. And cost is a consideration. The US is used to debt financing to pay for the excesses of military imagination.

Russia aims at doing more with less.
The MSM insists that the Russian economy will collapse because of excessive military spending — but that is projection — Russian military technology is not as profligate as its American counterpart.

The price quoted for the Su35 is a maximized figure— usually just over 50 to 60 million —making t the cheapest on the chart. million . One must also consider the maintenance needed to keep the F35 flying. Even with this, operational availability is less than 50%

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