A quick commentary to close this week on Iran and Ukraine.

The first question to bear in mind on Iran is: is the US serious about the MOU? Readers will predict my response: no way!

Why?

Devious Macron welcomes Trump at Versailles, chosen as the venue for the Iran-US MoU— part of US/NATO theater to deceive Iran as the Empire prepares a new round of attacks.

(2) So, if the US seems to proceed with an agreement that would run against its long-term interests you can assume it is only play-acting and, in the case of this administration at least, is quite capable at any time, even or perhaps especially in the midst of “negotiations,” of turning around, violating the agreement, assassinating negotiators or their leaders, and exhibiting equally atrocious and vomit-inducing behavior.

(3) If the US had been serious about the MOU, it would not have allowed inclusion of the paragraph about Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, as it clearly had no intention whatsoever in applying the necessary pressure on Israel to stop firing and withdraw.

(4) If the US had been serious about the MOU, it would not have allowed inclusion of the paragraph that acknowledges Iranian authority over the Strait as the US or its proxies (including the UN’s IMO) immediately began to explore routes through the Strait that they thought could bypass Iranian authority (the tankers involved shut down their transponders).

(5) If the US was serious about the MOU, it would not be spouting nonsense such as “Iran has to open up the Strait before nuclear negotiations.” Iran had already opened up the Strait, simply requiring tankers to keep to Iranian-approved routes. The US or its proxies violated that. As I shall never tire of repeating: all mentions, ever, about Iran and “nukes” in the mouths of US officials and their European minnows are ludicrous deceptions intended to confuse the world with the idea that Iran - with no actual nuclear weapon - poses a “nuclear threat” to Israel (with over 200 nuclear warheads) or to the US (with well over 10,000 means of destroying the globe).

(6) The unprovoked, murderous US-Israeli attacks on Iran have, as a major part of their rationale, not simply the Zionist agenda of a pro-US “greater Israel” in control of West Asia as their purpose, but to strike against China by reducing the flow of oil and other commodities to China from Iran (in addition to the cessation, already achieved, of the flow of oil from Venezuela to China), and to interrupt trade, energy and other links between China, Central Asia and Russia, most particularly across Turkic areas of influence south of the Caucasus, and in as many nations of southern and southeastern Asia that the US can destabilize and/or suborn.

(7) A joker in the pack is whether there is any truth in claims that Western oil reserves, including US oil reserves, are dangerously low, as Trump has claimed. Yes, there may be, but oil price rises are still very manageable ($75 a barrel right now for Brent crude).

Just forget about the MOU, forget about “negotiations” (yet again, we are told that Vance is going to be talking this weekend to Araghchi who, of course, should not be talking with anyone from Washington; no ceasefire but still talk and more talk): the only game of real importance here is US imperialism, whether it will be stopped by the Global South or by internal warfare between the US and its proxies (not happening any time soon, Greenland to one side), or within the US, or whether this wretched, heart-wrenching travesty of the once truly noble, if stained, legacy of people like Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Lincoln and Grant, will shut down this species and its planet.

Now, quickly, what is there to say about Ukraine? The main question for this weekend in my view is whether the Western assault on Russia through its Ukraine proxy, by crippling Crimea and striking Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers in the Azov, is existential for Russia, amidst gathering problems of destroyed oil refineries and shortages of gasoline - whose impacts are still foolishly downplayed by many pro-Russian commentators.

My answer is: probably not.

Because Russia, while it knows a fuse has been lit that makes this current situation very dangerous for us all, also can see it now has such leverage on the ground and in the air from Odessa, around Kherson and Zapporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk via Kostantynivka and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk conurbation, up to Kharkiv and around through Sumy to Chernihiv, that very soon it can utterly destroy Kiev’s command and control centers and do pretty much the same to those of Ukraine’s Western sponsors in Odessa and Lvov and will, if necessary, turn its attention to the forever squawking minnows, like Finland and Lithuania, now clamoring to host NATO nukes, or the military assets of their warmongering chums in Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris.

Azov Sea Shadow Fleet

The alternative media seem either to be on holiday (an affliction that has less impact than in the case of their mainstream adversaries), or unfocused within a dense fog of global threats or, again, simply unwilling to appropriately digest what for them is bad news within the overall compass of a narrative of a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world and from a perspective that is broadly sympathetic to Russia and to Russia’s rationale for its actions in February 2022 (which I, too, share).

In recent posts I have argued that Russia is facing challenges in NATO’s proxy war against it over the Ukraine-proxy-as-pretext (let’s call it UPAP) but winning the war. While I still retain that overall assessment (other posts will chronicle continuing overall Russian advances along the main combat lines) I note that two of the greatest threats to Russia include the Western-support intensification of Ukraine’s drone war on Russian energy assets, and the degradation of Russia’s hold in Crimea in a way that has dangerously sabotaged Russian ability to protect its fleet of hundreds of oil tankers in the Azov Sea, or to exit them safely through the strait of Kerch or, again, protect the city of Azov itself and its industrial chemical facilities.

Ukrainian strikes on vessels in the Sea of Azov - including dozens of tankers from Russia’s “shadow fleet”- are highly significant. By utilizing uncrewed naval drones to target these ships, Ukraine effectively isolates the Crimean Peninsula, degrades Russia’s military logistics in the south, and disrupts critical maritime oil revenues.

These maritime attacks, often carried out by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, directly impact the broader conflict. The Sea of Azov is a vital transport corridor. By attacking tankers carrying fuel from Russian ports to Crimea, Ukraine severely complicates the ability of Russian forces to resupply their southern group of forces. Russia relies heavily on a “shadow fleet” of aging, obscurely owned tankers to bypass Western sanctions and the G7 oil price cap. Targeting these vessels directly weakens Russia’s energy-export revenues, contributing to domestic fuel shortages and export bans within Russia. Ukraine’s ability to reliably strike dozens (the number 45 is cited today by Military Summary) of Russian ships over a matter of days demonstrates the continued success of its asymmetrical naval strategy. By deploying advanced sea drones rather than relying on a traditional navy, Kyiv is successfully neutralizing large portions of Russian naval logistics while imposing localized blockades on occupied territories.

The overall energy war (Russia targeting gas stations and other energy facilities in Ukraine, Ukraine targeting Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities) threatens to dent the volume of Russian oil sales, applies greater pressure on oil prices at a time when these are already under threat from the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, make it more difficult for countries to restock oil reserves, and contributes to the possibility of a looming global economic recession or depression.

The dual campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet in the Sea of Azov and its domestic energy infrastructure has escalated significantly, triggering acute fuel supply strains across parts of Russia.

The technical evolution of these strikes, their integration with the wider air campaign, and their geopolitical and economic consequences are detailed below, incorporating perspectives from both Ukrainian operations and pro-Russian defense analysis.

1. Technical Evolution: Types of Ukrainian Sea Drones

Ukraine’s naval arsenal has rapidly transformed from improvisations into specialized, multi-domain autonomous weapons:

• Sireena (Anti-Aircraft/Interceptor USVs): the Sireena travels at speeds up to 56 mph and carries a 300 kg explosive payload. Crucially, it features a Seadragon launcher firing AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air missiles alongside comprehensive electronic warfare (EW) jamming suites to blind communications, satellite navigation, and Russian combat aircraft.

• Upgraded Sea Baby (FPV Motherships): Operated by the SBU, these surface vessels have a 930-mile range and act as offshore launchpads. They carry 6 to 8 first-person-view (FPV) attack drones inside compartments- some guided by un-jammable fiber-optic cables - enabling strikes against port infrastructure and littoral targets.

• Sea Trident ST-1000 (Autonomous Submersibles): Representing a push into underwater warfare, this heavy autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) boasts a massive 1,000 kg payload, a 2,000 nautical mile range, and can operate at depths of up to 60 meters to stealthily target hulls or intercept Russian undersea assets.

Pro-Russian Technical Assessment:

Pro-Russian military analysts emphasize that Ukraine is pioneering “network-centric naval guerrilla warfare.” Russian observers note that Ukraine’s use of fiber-optic tethers on its river and sea drones neutralizes Russia’s heavy investment in electronic warfare jamming. Russian military bloggers heavily advocate for the deployment of rapid-response machine-gun nests on coastal ships, increased naval aviation patrols, and mandatory underwater hull inspections at key ports to counter the low-profile signatures of these drones.

2. Correlation with Deep-Strike Attacks on Oil Refineries

The maritime strikes on tankers in the Sea of Azov are the aquatic extension of an “industrial scale” aerial drone campaign targeting the entirety of Russia’s refining capacity. Ukraine successfully struck the Omsk Refinery in Siberia - Russia’s largest oil processing facility, sitting over 1,700 miles (2,700 km) from Ukrainian lines. The strike completely halted processing at a facility that handled 460,000 barrels of crude per day. Parallel long-range strikes have battered the Kapotnia refinery in Moscow, the Taneco and Taif-NK facilities in Tatarstan, the Saratov refinery, and energy hubs in Bashkortostan.

While aerial drones stop fuel from being produced, sea drones stop existing fuel from moving. Unmanned Systems Forces struck 21 vessels in a 72-hour window - including 19 shadow fleet tankers - effectively choking off the Volga River-to-Caspian Sea maritime routes that supply the Russian southern group of forces and occupied Crimea.

Russian state media and defense channels frame these deep-tier refinery strikes as acts of economic terrorism heavily guided by Western satellite intelligence. Pro-Russian commentary admits that the geographical breadth of the attacks has overstretched domestic air defense networks (like the Pantsir-S1 and S-400 systems), forcing Moscow to choose between protecting front-line military bases or vital civilian economic infrastructure deep inside the Urals and Siberia.

3. Broader Impact on Global Prices and Sanctions Enforcement

The strategic fallout of the campaign stretches far beyond the Black and Azov seas, impacting on international energy balances and global sanctions mechanisms:

The immediate consequence of losing the Omsk facility and Azov transit lines has been an acute domestic fuel crisis inside Russia. Facing major gasoline/diesel shortages, long gas station lines, and rationing in multiple regions, the Kremlin officially announced a temporary ban on all diesel exports to insulate its domestic market.

Russia’s shadow fleet consists of older, obscurely owned vessels used specifically to evade G7 price caps and Western sanctions. Kyiv treats these shadow tankers as high-value military targets because they consider that their un-insured, “illegal” (according to NATO perspectives) transport of oil directly funds the Kremlin’s war budget. By physically destroying these tankers, Ukraine achieves what Western paper sanctions could not. Insurance premiums for any vessel willing to call on Russian Black Sea ports have skyrocketed, making the shadow fleet operation increasingly cost-prohibitive.

Pro-Russian economic analysts argue that Ukraine’s strategy carries massive collateral risks for global energy stability and Western economies. Russian outlets stress that taking substantial Russian refining and transit capacity offline forces Moscow to export more raw crude (often redirected to India and China) while heavily restricting refined products. They argue this dynamic will ultimately trigger a global surge in diesel and fuel prices, penalizing Western European consumers. Furthermore, Russian authorities warn that striking loaded tankers in tight, shared waterways like the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea risks causing catastrophic, long-term environmental and ecological damage to littoral neutral nations.

In the meantime, we should not ignore the success of Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian energy assets, especially gas stations, in recent weeks. These have had a number of striking consequences. They have forced Ukraine to pull back many of their drone launch facilities into Central Ukraine, giving Russia more time to prepare to strike Ukrainian drones down as they approach, so increasing Russia’s drone-destruction rate; they are logistically isolating important cities such as Kiev itself, Kharkiv (Ukraine’s second largest city), Sumy and Chernihiv in a manner that might greatly expedite a Russian invasion and takeover of Kiev.

Assessing Ukraine’s Drone War

Ben Aris has recently provided a sober assessment of Ukraine’s drone war. Despite possibly winning a license to produce Patriot (PAC-3) interceptors (something that, even if it ever happens, is going to take some time) and even being promised some more interceptors by Trump in the immediate future, the reality, after Operation Epic Fury, is that the US has all but run out of spares and will hardly part with much of the remaining ammo it still has in its strategic reserve of some 60 systems.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) may be down to fewer than 16 missiles, and firing only one missile at incoming Russian missiles instead of the usual two. Thousands of people are spending the night in Kyiv subway stations again because of the incessant bombardment of the capital by Russian missiles. The skies over the Ukrainian capital are open again and Russia can hit whatever it wants.

While much has been made in the Western mainstream press of Ukrainian prowess and the enormous expansion of production from nothing in 2022 to around 7mn drones a year, with new varieties appearing on a weekly basis, Aris notes that Russia is also making somewhere between 7mn and 9mn drones a year and has also been innovating. He concludes that in the drones arms race, Russia is probably still in the lead. As for missiles, Russia is churning them out at at a rate of about 2,500 missiles a year - double what it was doing last year, and the missiles are becoming increasingly sophisticated. They include hypersonic missiles, something which, amazingly (after I first identified the importance of these in the context of assessing the RussiaGate hoax back in 2020) America still does not have - not in combat, anyway.

Ukraine’s vaunted home-produced Flamingo cruise missile is produced in dozens, not thousands and, because of technical problems with the guidance system are not very accurate. Ukrainian drones don’t carry a large enough payload and cannot flatten a refinery. Russia’s missiles by contrast can flatten a power station. Russia also has FAB glide bombs which can carry up to 3,000 kilos of explosives, whereas as typical drone only carries about 50kg of TNT. Some of the FAB bombs are also now jet propelled.

As for Europe, Nato General Secretary Mark Rutte told Ankara that Europe needs to spend €40bn on a drone wall to protect its eastern flank from potential Russian swarms. But he also admitted this plan will take five years to implement. Aris calculates that if Rutte wants to match Russia’s drone arsenal in five years’ time, Europe’s drone production has to increase by 1,120-fold in that period or 300% per year. Europe may be currently producing somewhere between only 100,000 and 200,000 drones a year.

“If the idea is to invest €40bn into producing European drones over the next five years then Europe has already lost the war it’s suggesting it’s about to have with Russia.”

A joint US Ukraine drone initiative is a half measure that involves a copy of the Iranian Shahed drones -- LUCAS (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System).

“If Russia were to try and invade Europe with a swarm for a few thousand drones, then the war would be probably over in a week after Russian drones and missiles decimate airfields, air defenses and logistical support dumps in the first few days.

It is a totally bonkers set up. It suggests to me that no one is actually expecting to go to war with Russia as there is no serious plan to defend Europe, or at least the solution – tie up with Ukraine - is being ignored. The actual plan remains as it always was: to get Ukraine to fight Russia and run down its military power. If it really was about security, if you really did think Russia was about to invade, then they would rush to get Ukraine on board as fast as they can.”

In the Wake of Ankara

Writing for IntelliNews, Ben Aris (again) confirms that Ukraine has hit every single one of Russia’s 30 major oil refineries. Zelenskiy claims that Ukraine now makes 60% of its own weapons and now has its first cruise missiles that are starting to appear on the battlefield. But Aris concedes, along with some Ukrainian and American sources that Russia is advancing on the battlefield and that there is now a very real possibility that the last bit of the Donbas could fall by autumn.

Perhaps Zelenskiy will be helped by gifts from Trump during Ankara: a Patriot production license and a mega drones-for-wesapons deal. While Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov appears to have despaired of US attempts to advance negotiations, Putin and his spokesperson Peskov are more circumspect about the prospect for keeping the door open to continuing dialog with Washington. Aris says that back channel talks are still ongoing between Witkoff, Kushner and Dmitriev, with a chance that talks will resume in August.

Aris describes the Patriot licence as an empty gesture.

“Put aside the difficulties for actually getting it approved – which are significant – even if the files are sent to Kyiv it will take years before any factor can come online. A similar project running in Germany is going to take at least four years to complete and won’t start producing interceptor missiles until 2028.”

Ukraine is entirely dependent on the US for the interceptors. It can’t just “make its own,” as it will still be dependent on the US for the components that go into making them. Ukraine has all but run out of interceptors and needs replacements today. Rather than supplying these, Trump is more likely interested in the prospects for developing his own US LUCAS (Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) drone, a rip-off Iran’s Shahed drones.

The US has sent Ukraine no further actual money since Trump took over.

In Ankara, Nato members made a pledge to give Ukraine €70bn of support, mostly for defense. This gives Ukraine sufficient support to the end of 2026, beyond which funding will remain an issue. Further, the total promised is just an addition of previous pledges.

Rutte tried to raise new money by proposing a 0.25% of GDP tax on all European NATO members, but they don’t have the money. Both the Netherlands and Finland announced they have run out of money for Ukraine. Prolific spending on Ukraine has already cost UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer his job, is about to cost French President Emmanuel Macron his job in next year’s elections (Marine Le Pen is back in the race for the French presidency, despite her fraud conviction,and might win) and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition is looking increasingly wobbly. By 2028 when Ukraine’s money runs out, Aris thinks the European political landscape will have radically changed and be populated by far-right national-popularist parties that want to end the war.

Perhaps this is what Putin is waiting on and, if so, this may help explain why Russia continues to hold its punches. The biggest fly in this ointment is Trump’s change of heart on Ukraine. He had been hoping to close on the so-called Dmitriev package of business deals worth a reported astonishing $12 trillion but these do not seem to have gained traction nor have Putin’s hopes for sanctions relief gone anywhere. Aris puts this down to Trump’s focus on winning the November mid-terms.

More generally we can regard NATO as a forum whose economic wing is about the sale of (mainly) US arms while applying pressure on members to buy them (as in Trump and Rutte pushing members to spend 5% of their GDP), while its political wing is about providing the pretexts for conflicts in which those arms will be needed.

Ana Vračar for BreakThrough News (Bresakthrough) notes that this year’s summit is held back-to-back with the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum where Rutte emphasized new large-scale procurement contracts, including new transatlantic military industrial partnerships that will allow “NATO to sustain key American capabilities such as the Abrams tank, AMRAAMS [air-to-air missiles], ATACMS [short-range supersonic ballistic missile], the Barracuda-500M, Small Diameter Bombs, and Stingers, here in Europe.”