The Horrors of Child Labor in Libertarian England....(continued, p. 2)
4. The Path to Legal Reform
J. Matson Heininger
End of Empire: A Report to America
The first lie is the oldest one. The political class tells the country that it is acting in self-defense, that Iran is the aggressor, and that whatever turmoil follows was forced upon Washington. But the public record points in the opposite direction. The United States and Israel opened this war with strikes inside Iran, and only afterward did Iran retaliate across the region. Everything that has followed has been wrapped in the familiar language of reluctant necessity, as if offensive war becomes defense by repetition. That inversion matters because empires do not collapse only from battlefield losses. They collapse when their governing language loses contact with reality and becomes a system for evading responsibility.
That severance from reality is visible first in the military sphere. American power remains formidable, but it is no longer uncontested, no longer cheap, and no longer reliable in the old way. U.S. forces eventually flew B-52 bombers over Iranian territory, yet they did so only after weeks of strikes meant to suppress Iranian air defenses, and even then Washington continued to rely heavily on long-range standoff weapons rather than behaving as if Iranian skies had become an open corridor. Iran, meanwhile, has inflicted meaningful damage on U.S. aircraft and on the forward basing structure on which American power in the region depends. The essential point is not that the United States has become weak in any absolute sense. It is that it can no longer destroy while remaining largely untouched itself.
Even this description remains the more cautious picture offered by mainstream and establishment reporting. If one turns instead to dissident or alternative analysts such as Scott Ritter, Larry Johnson, and other former military or intelligence commentators outside official gatekeeping, the appraisal becomes darker still. In that world of analysis, one hears that Israel’s devastation is arithmetically greater than Washington admits, that the true number of destroyed aircraft may be far beyond the officially acknowledged figures, that as many as 40 planes have been destroyed on the ground at U.S. bases in the region, and that roughly 13 bases have been degraded to the point of practical uselessness. Some of these claims remain unverified in open public reporting. Yet they deserve mention because the official record in American war-making has so often understated losses, blurred operational realities, and delayed public recognition of strategic failure.
For the ruling orders, hard as they may try, lying with impunity may soon be a thing of the past.
From there the argument moves naturally to industry, because the military weakness is inseparable from the productive weakness underneath it. The second illusion is that American industrial decline can be repaired simply by appropriating more money. The Iran war has already drained critical U.S. munitions inventories, including high-end missiles and interceptors, and even sympathetic analysts concede that rebuilding some of these stocks will take years. This is not a temporary procurement inconvenience. It is evidence of a deeper hollowing-out in which the country can expend sophisticated weapons much faster than it can reproduce them. Money can authorize purchases. It cannot instantly recreate factories, supply chains, machine tools, or skilled labor.
That is why the economic dimension of this crisis must be understood more seriously than it is being discussed. Even the pro-U.S. and predictably optimistic IMF has been forced to darken its outlook and warn that a worsening war could push the world toward what it still prefers to call a near-recession or a broad global recession. Its language remains cautious because institutions of that kind always speak in euphemism. But if even that voice has begun to warn in this register, a less euphemistic reading is warranted. The world may be moving toward something structurally worse than the Great Depression, not because every statistic yet resembles the 1930s, but because the old mechanisms of recovery are gone.
That comparison belongs here because the weakness is not merely cyclical. In the 1930s, the United States still possessed enormous dormant productive capacity, a stronger external position, and a material base that could be reactivated. Today it is more financialized, more dependent on imports in critical sectors, and more vulnerable to disruption in energy, fertilizer, shipping, and industrial inputs. Public spending under such conditions runs headlong into real shortages. It may generate nominal demand, but it cannot decree steel mills, fertilizer plants, shipyards, machine-tool capacity, or disciplined industrial labor back into existence. The likely result is not a renewal of productive strength but a mixture of inflation, scarcity, anger, and renewed financial instability.
There is also a monetary dimension that further separates the present from the Depression era. Then, the dollar still existed inside a gold-based order and the United States possessed vast gold reserves and a much stronger external position. Today the system depends on global confidence in dollar claims, on the willingness of other countries to recycle surpluses through American financial markets, and on the continued acceptance of a geopolitical order that this war is actively weakening. Even if dedollarization proceeds only gradually, the arithmetic is moving in the wrong direction. A war that raises oil prices, punishes third countries, disrupts trade, and advertises American recklessness invites other states to reduce exposure to the dollar system over time. Dedollarization does not have to become complete to become dangerous. It only has to become meaningful enough to erode the financial privilege on which imperial overreach has long depended.
Once this is understood, the alliance problem also looks different. America’s rulers still behave as if alliances are permanent assets rather than conditional bargains. Yet this war has shown allies and host countries that association with the United States now carries growing economic, political, and military risk. Gulf bases have become targets. Shipping lanes have become unstable. Populations far from Washington are being asked to absorb inflation, supply disruption, and strategic danger because American leaders chose escalation. Even where formal expulsion does not come immediately, the direction of travel is clear. An empire eventually discovers that credibility is not preserved by issuing ever louder threats. It survives only so long as clients believe the patron still provides more security than danger.
All of this feeds the darkest question of all. The gravest danger is not only that the United States may lose wars, but that parts of its elite may decide that a devastated world with America still on top is preferable to a more peaceful world in which America no longer dominates.
The Iran war has combined conventional military strain, depleted munitions, vulnerable bases, economic fragility, and a political class almost incapable of admitting limits. Under such conditions, nuclear weapons become the final instrument of primacy, the last tool that does not depend on rebuilding factories quickly, persuading allies, or accepting diminished status. There is no public proof that senior planners are presently preparing deliberate first use in this war. But the structure that could encourage such thought has plainly grown more dangerous: weakened conventional advantages, fading restraints, technocratic language that launders moral enormity, and near silence from a political establishment that should be shouting about escalation every day.
That silence may be the most damning sign of all. It is worth imagining, for contrast, what a politically aware and basically decent ruling class would sound like at such a moment. At least half the Senate and large blocs in the House would be speaking daily about the possibility of global catastrophe, about depleted arsenals, exposed bases, oil shock, food insecurity, industrial weakness, and the wider strategic collapse now underway. They would be warning the public in plain language. They would be searching openly for a path out of the trap. That is not what is happening. The most visible noise is often redirected toward matters that may be objectionable in themselves but are radically out of scale with the danger at hand. The mismatch between the magnitude of the crisis and the narrowness of official debate is itself evidence of decay.
This is why so many public figures who still market themselves as reformers now ring hollow. Their language remains bounded by a system they claim to criticize, and their objections rarely rise to the level demanded by a moment that may involve civilizational stakes. The problem is not only cowardice. It is deeper than that. Too many political actors remain committed to preserving the legitimacy of a rotten structure rather than naming it as rotten. They remain attached to procedural quarrels inside a system that is moving toward breakdown.
America must stop telling itself that it is the injured party in a crisis it helped create. It must stop pretending that monetary privilege is the same as productive strength, that sanctions are strategy, that aircraft carriers and stealth bombers can substitute for an industrial base, and that nuclear superiority can redeem civilizational decay. None of those beliefs are remedies any longer. They are relics of an order already passing away.
The country is not confronting a temporary policy error. It is confronting the accumulated consequences of empire: deindustrialization, financial dependency, moral numbness, strategic overextension, and a governing class that seems increasingly willing to risk global ruin rather than accept historical limits. If that reality is not faced now, then the end of empire will not be a managed descent. It will be a violent unraveling, carried outward onto the world and inward onto the American people themselves.
On April 10 I published a document titled Phoenix America. I have been sharing it in many places since, mainly to provoke discussion and thought as the country approaches another midterm election in which Americans will once again be invited to pretend that choosing between red and blue is a meaningful form of political agency.
Phoenix America is a detailed outline for a new Constitution of the United States. It is an attempt to imagine a framework far better for the common citizen, far better for the country, and far less dangerous to the rest of the world than the decaying order now failing before our eyes.
I link it here.
Vanessa Beeley
SUBSTACK
The Syrian quisling President, selected by the enemies of Syria, has gone on record trying to explain what President Trump mean’t when he said Syria could deal with Hezbollah after Israel’s failure to defeat the Lebanese Resistance. In a recent interviewAbu Mohammed Al Jolani said:
From President Trump’s statement, the answer is that he was expressing frustration with what is happening in Lebanon and looking for other solutions, and that there could be a positive role for Syria through the Lebanese state and Lebanese institutions.
In tones dictated for him by MI6, Jolani went out on a limb to deny the potential for any military action against Hezbollah and Lebanon - he said Syria should support the ‘Lebanese state, strengthening its institutions, and building channels of communication among the political parties and active forces in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, in search of a security solution that everyone can accept.’
Taking the words of a terrorist operative in the pay of the entire regime-change alliance that finally brought the war of resistance to an end in 2024, would be foolish. It is far better to surveil the surrounding operations and actions on the ground that belie Jolani’s dulcet tones.
In my first article on the ‘Burning Borders” I go into some detail about the build-up of a strike force along the eastern Lebanese border with Syria. My information is from very reliable sources inside and outside Syria who remain anonymous for their security.
After Ukrainian President Zelensky visited Damascus in April 2026, I started to receive reports of Ukrainian forces gathering, firstly in Tartous and now in western Aleppo. The same Ukrainian build-up was seen in Idlib, during the year prior to the HTS attack on Aleppo that resulted in the capture of Damascus in December 2024. It must be presumed that Ukraine will again supply drone technology and equipment to the Jolani militia, while perhaps enabling Jolani to despatch foreign mercenaries to the Ukraine-Russia frontlines.
On June 20th the US-led coalition in Syria bombed the headquarters of the Turkistan party in the Idlib countryside. Also assassinated was Sami Al Oraydi, a senior leader and ideological figure in the armed group Haras Al Din. HaD were a thorn in the side of the Jolani bid for power in Idlib. I reported, previously, on the US Coalition efforts to weaken HaD on behalf of Jolani, striking headquarters and command structures with coordinates provided by Jolani.
Since Jolani was handed power and dominance over Syrian territory - there has been a concerted attempt to dismantle the ideological vanguard of ‘global jihad’. The landscape of Idlib in north-west Syria has become a complex arena where the strategic objectives of international security intersect with shifting local power dynamics. The ongoing elimination of Al Qaeda/ISIS figures by the international coalition should not be viewed in isolation from the overarching objectives of the US-Israel-led alliance and the operational alignment of local actors, led by Jolani and Hayat Tahrir As Sham (HTS). Understanding this operational framework is vital to predict Washington’s agenda to neutralise any cross-border threats to their control of Syria and to the security of “Israel”.
The Convergence: Jolani’s Alignment with the Coalition’s Objectives
There is a predictable ‘civil war’ waging on many levels inside Syria but particularly within the ‘jihadist’ movement itself. Since his rise to power, Jolani has undergone an orchestrated political transformation, shifting from allegiance to ISIS and then Al Qaeda, to the role of a ruler that seeks international legitimacy.
This campaign by Jolani to rein in his more ideologically extreme positions, places him in opposition to the ideological hardliners and traditional guardians of Al Qaeda’s doctrine. This poses a threat to his MI6-model of governance and his outward narrative of “moderation and pragmatism” that he takes great pains to present to the West and regionally.
This has led to two results. First, the HTS campaign to dismantle, imprison and undermine the foreign extremist fighters and veteran leaders who reject the Jolani regime project. Secondly, there is a concerted backlash from groups like ISIS who have been leading attacks against Jolani’s militia.
These campaigns by Jolani to root out and dismantle opposition are the model he used when in control of Idlib and the “Salvation Government”. While HTS did not have a monopoly on power within the SG, those in government could only remain in power with the blessing of HTS - typical mafia warlord turf management. HTS maintained control of economy (corruption) and security (foreign intelligence). Both sectors enabled Jolani to “coup-proof” his reign over Idlib. As a local journalist (2021) put it, “Al-Jolani is the safety valve of HTS’s different currents, which constantly compete for power and cash.” In 2026, not much has changed but the enemies of Jolani and his Western pivot have grown in numbers and strength.
This consistent internal Syrian dynamic is a valuable asset for Western intelligence agencies. The HTS crackdown enables the efficient assassination and monitoring of figures or groups that might pose a future threat to Western territories or regimes.
Back to Sami Al Oraydi, a highly influential Jordanian ideologue whose true significance extends far beyond a mere traditional military or operational assessment. Al Oraydi held a PhD in Islamic Sharia Law and represented the foremost doctrinal and jurisprudential authority for Al Qaeda in the Levant. The path to this position evolved through various historic stages.
In 2014-2016 Al Oraydi assumed the position of the chief religious authority of Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Qaeda in Syria). He formulated the group’s ideological, extremist literature to ensure that the militia remained under the doctrinal umbrella of Al Qaeda’s central leadership.
In 2016, Jolani severed ties with JAN and changed the name of the group, first to Jabhat Fatah Al Sham and then to Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham. Al Oraydi led the faction that rejected this move by Jolani, on ideological grounds. He judged that Jolani’s move was motivated by political and Western-influenced “pragmatism” which was later proven to be correct.
Al Oraydi formed the Guardians of the Faith (Haras Al Din) in 2018 in response to Jolani’s ‘betrayal’ of the Al Qaeda doctrine. Haras Al Din then became the official Al Qaeda branch in Syria. Not that this means that the militia under the command of Jolani were any less brutal or sectarian in their campaigns against the Syrian people. You can put a terrorist in a suit and tie but you cannot take the terrorism out of the terrorist. The ethnic cleansing campaigns against minorities across all of Syria are evidence that Jolani may have abandoned the visible hardliner ideology but he still retains the DNA of a sectarian supremacist.
In 2020 Al Oraydi warned the Takfiri groups in Idlib of being subjected to “international understandings”, describing the international understandings as a “trick”. He said “the attempts of some people who resort to the criminals and international understandings and agreements under the pretext of policy and common interests, can not trick us.” One must assume he was referring to Jolani at this point. One year later, in 2021, Jolani performed his first rebranding interview with ‘journalist’ Martin Smith of PBS Frontline, during which he distanced himself posing any threat to the US or Europe and began the process of achieving his removal from the US terrorist designation list.
Al Oraydi assumed the position of the chief religious authority and became the principal ideologue opposing HTS local agendas in Idlib and was officially designated a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ by the US in April 2023. The US State Department’s ‘Rewards for Justice’ programme has offered a cash reward of up to $5 million for any information leading to his arrest or location.
Al Oraydi was among the primary threats to Jolani’s leadership. His extremist-ideological leadership and preservation of Al Qaeda’s core doctrine mean’t that he was key to their recruitment drives and opposition to the Jolani Western pivot. His assassination by the US-led coalition signals the need to protect the Jolani leadership at this stage in the Zionist expansionist project and campaign to degrade all regional resistance groups.
The ‘ideological decapitation’ strategy
By assassinating figures of Al Oraydi’s calibre in this cycle of directed elimination, the US-Zionist alliance is implementing a strategy of ideological decapitation. Military and field commanders are easily replaceable from among the ranks of ISIS or Al Qaeda. Compensating for the loss of ideologues who wield influence beyond that of military leadership will pose a major dilemma for these Takfiri factions. To some degree, it will deprive the group of its religious legitimacy, undermine internal cohesion, trigger internal conflict and weaken its attraction to potential funding, arming and recruits.
We reached the stage of culling the terrorist leaders and factions that are no longer “fit for purpose” in order to sustain the Jolani leadership which is currently essential for Washington and Tel Aviv to maintain a stranglehold over the Syrian population and territory.
Tactical Success versus Strategic Sustainability
From a military perspective, this US-Zionist approach appears, on the surface, to be highly productive in curbing immediate external threats. However it does entail structural risks, excessive reliance on military and operational solutions removes the imminent threat but the political and societal vacuum remains a festering sore inside Syria since December 2024. There is also potential that the assassinated ideologues are elevated to the status of “martyr” by their followers ensuring revenge operations, backlash against the perpetrators and allies of the West as they are perceived by these factions and the creation of dangerous underground cells that will lie dormant until triggered.
Looking ahead to the security landscape in the Levant
A realistic assessment of the situation in north-western Syria shows that the international coalition’s tactical successes have become deeply intertwined with the survival strategies pursued by local forces such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
Every al-Qaeda leader who is neutralised certainly reduces the immediate risk of external attacks against the West, but at the same time, it contributes to consolidating al-Jolani’s autocratic authority in Idlib, thereby lending indirect credibility to the argument that previously designated organisations can secure a place in the regional game simply by acting as ‘policemen’ against more radical factions. A classic gangs and counter gangs strategy.
A military analyst who left Syria recently told me:
Looking ahead, it appears that these surgical operations will continue to undermine al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities and keep it on the defensive and in retreat, with the aim of ensuring its survival and securing loyalty to al-Jolani as a strategic objective.
However, long-term stability will not be achieved through drone strikes alone; as long as the broader Syrian political conflict and sectarian killing sprees continue with no end in sight, this environment will remain fertile ground for the reproduction and expansion of extremist ideology.
It should be argued that the US-Zionist military operations are nothing more than a tool for crisis management and containment in an increasingly pressurised and explosive Syrian environment. Long term this is also not a cure for the phenomenon of cross-border extremism that may well backfire on the sponsors of these terrorist organisations to overthrow the former Syrian government and to destabilise the nation that represents the backbone of the Resistance Axis in the region.
Yesterday Syria witnessed the first session of the trial of Syria’s former Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, which opened before the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus.
Continue reading on the next page
Julian Macfarlane
NEWS FORENSICS
I did a couple of posts recently about the widespread acceptance of the media story that Iran had mined the Strait of Hormuz.
For example:
And
To get how pervasive – and persuasive-- the “narrative” was, you only needed to check Larry Johnson’s Sonar 21, which provides you with interviews with all the most popular commentators. Everybody who is anybody, went with the mine story - even the excellent Alastair Crooke.
I am of course Mr. Nobody! Just an old guy who lives with two cats, and can’t spell worth shit. You know, a walking “dys” guy
Now, however, Larry Johnson, who I criticized for parroting the media narrative on mines has suddenly come out with an analysis almost identical with my own.
Finally.
I don’t mean that in a cynical way. I love Larry although I not going to buy one of those shirts or start smoking cigars (ugh).
That said, Johnson should be honored for his U-Turns, when he acknowledges them, which he does from time to time.
No, I don’t think he reads New Forensics. I did write him an email on this - -but I am sure he is too busy to reply.
I do think that his turn-around came from somewhere — maybe some “source” who did ask the obvious question I did – “why has no ship that we know of out of the many that have passed through the Strait, not hit a mine?”
I am sure that others besides me and Chappy and Ichi must have asked this question, out of the thousands of commentators on X and other media.
That said, as I also wrote — it is not in Iran’s interest to rebut the Western narrative— since it’s a good excuse for obtaining service fees or other moneys from GCC states, Western corporations or governments. Iran needs the money for reconstruction .
Of course, if sea mines were really laid, it would cost a lot to remove them.
Some estimates are up to $3 billion. Again, no one really knows and this ambiguity is strategic, providing Iran with a lot of leverage.
How difficult is it going to be to clear a passage to the point that shipping companies perceive that it’s safe again?
You’ve hit on just the right point: People have to perceive that it’s safe enough. We think that Iran has laid a relatively small number of mines. But it is extraordinarily difficult and slow to try to clear mines under fire. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/05/demining-the-strait-of-hormuz-qa-with-scott-savitz.html
In 2025, the Navy decommissioned its four remaining Avenger-class minesweepers in the Middle East. Currently, only four aging Avenger-class ships remain in service, all in Sasebo, Japan
Anyway, thank you for asking— but Iran is not going to allow the US Navy to do it!
As we saw last time, Hormuz is a sovereign waterway, with rights shared between Oman and Iran—regardless of US policy. Geography allows Iran to dictate what happens here militarily and economically.
What about the GCC?
June 25, 2026 (GCC–US Joint Ministerial Meeting - Manama, Bahrain): Co-chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Bahraini Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani. Discussions focused on the interim US-Iran agreement, securing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and bolstering GCC
Having given up their sovereignty by permitting US bases for American-Israeli strikes on Iran, the GCC countries don’t have much to say.
The MoU? A ceasefire? Peace?
When will Peace break out?
Remember what I wrote last time: for the US, Peace is War.
We have moved from conventional war to “low intensity war”.
Which brings us back to mines. Sorry, us old guys meander…..As I said, Iran (probably) hasn’t so far deployed mines. But it could in future — and given their accelerated technological progress that could be a game changer.
But, thankfully, there are other things to find solace in. Like...
Rescue a Senior…
/ @danieltigerkitty Chappy and Ichi rescued me.
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Meet Felix, the 24-year old grandpa of cats, still enjoying life.
Oliver Boyd-Barrett
Salvador strongman, Nayib Bukele, has offered Trump to take US citizens into his maximum security prisons.
I have posted several times recently on the tragic crises of Venezuela and Cuba. For those who found inspiration in the 1950s and 1960s from indigenous and Latin resistance to US and European imperial machinations in South America, these are indeed dark days, further blighted by parallel reactionary developments throughout the continent.
Colombia
Espriella. In Bukele's mould or worse.
The June 2026 presidential election in Colombia involved significant United States diplomatic activity, congressional reactions, and discussions surrounding the drug war and regional security. Prior to the vote, some U.S. political figures expressed support for certain candidates. Following the runoff, U.S. officials congratulated the candidate who was leading in preliminary counts and discussed future cooperation on regional security, economic ties, and immigration. The outgoing President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, criticized U.S. political actions, viewing them as interference.
Following the close preliminary results, President Petro made public allegations concerning U.S. and other international involvement in the election outcome. The involvement of U.S. figures in the election sparked domestic political debate within the United States. A group of U.S. Members of Congress issued a statement expressing concern about U.S. officials attempting to influence the vote and emphasizing the importance of Colombia's self-determination. Leading up to the election, the U.S. government engaged with the Petro administration on various matters. Past U.S. actions, including sanctions and legal investigations, were discussed in the context of their potential influence on the political landscape. Critics suggested these actions could be seen as leverage impacting the successor of President Petro.
The U.S. has expressed interest in aligning Colombia with its security strategies. One candidate indicated support for collaborating with U.S. anti-cartel efforts, including certain military tactics and policies related to coca cultivation. The “Drug War” is a brand invariably promoted by the US in pursuit of political and military gain in the region. U.S. interest in the election was also linked to broader geopolitical considerations, including relations with other global powers. While the previous administration had developed ties with China for investment, the incoming government’s stance on international partnerships is being observed for potential shifts in alignment.
With only about 250,000 votes separating the two candidates out of more than 26 million cast, De La Espriella takes office on August 7 with a narrow popular mandate that hardly augurs a period of stability.
The election serves as a direct referendum on President Petro’s “Total Peace” negotiation strategy. De La Espriella campaigned on a heavy-handed, El Salvador-style “iron fist” approach to completely abandon talks and aggressively dismantle groups that conservatives conveniently dismiss as “rebel” or “cartel” but which are intimately interwoven with political formations and their militaristic branches, both official and otherwise. The electoral map highlights a stark internal divide. Cepeda dominated peripheral regions, the vulnerable Pacific coast, and Bogotá, whereas De La Espriella capitalized on the Andean center, major commercial cities, and regions severely impacted by ongoing border violence. De La Espriella’s party, the National Salvation Movement, holds minimal seats in Congress. Passing structural tax overhauls or changes to the 2016 FARC peace accord will require complex coalition-building with traditional establishment conservative parties that he routinely lambasted on the campaign trail.
Bolivia
The current crisis represents a major setback for the left-wing Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Progressive forces, long accustomed to being in power under former President Evo Morales, are now largely marginalized in mainstream governance, facing a center-right administration.
The pushback has not been a unified progressive front. Rather, it is a cascade of independent sectoral demands from teachers, miners, and transport workers. This ideological fragmentation weakens the movement’s ability to present a cohesive alternative to conservative governance.
Progressive organizations and Indigenous movements face severe stigmatization. The government and international allies (including the US State Department) have labeled parts of the mobilization as destabilizing or an attempted coup. State of emergency legislation grants armed forces wide latitude to intervene, raising fears of escalating human rights issues and the criminalization of protests.
The progressive wing is in disarray following an arrest warrant issued against Morales. With its historic figurehead evading charges, the left is struggling to channel popular anger into a unified political force
Accusations regarding United States manipulation of electoral outcomes in Bolivia are a subject of significant geopolitical debate, with no consensus on direct, clandestine manipulation of vote counts. Instead, discussions around U.S. influence focus on diplomatic pressure, development aid, and regional alignments.
The most prominent recent allegations of U.S. involvement stem from the controversial October 2019 presidential election. Following a sudden 24-hour halt in the preliminary vote count, the Organization of American States conducted an audit and claimed to find “intentional manipulation” and “serious irregularities” favoring incumbent President Evo Morales. This report triggered mass protests, leading to the military forcing Morales to resign, an event he and his supporters labeled a U.S.-backed coup.
Critics and left-wing politicians, including Morales, argue that the OAS acts as a diplomatic tool for Washington to destabilize leftist governments. Research from independent bodies, including the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, and The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) subsequently challenged the OAS’s statistical findings. They argued that the late-stage surge for Morales was a normal trend caused by slower-reporting rural districts where his support was strongest.
Beyond the 2019 crisis, accusations of U.S. interference traditionally point to overt political and economic pressure rather than direct election tampering. Historically, Bolivian leaders accused the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) of funding right-wing opposition groups and civic organizations - specifically in wealthy, separatist-leaning regions like Santa Cruz - to weaken the ruling leftist party. This friction led to Evo Morales expelling USAID from Bolivia.
The U.S. has frequently tied regional aid and trade preferences to Bolivia’s eradication of coca leaf crops. Left-wing factions argue that Washington uses drug-war certification to economically pressure the government and alienate the indigenous rural voting base, which relies heavily on traditional coca farming.
Peru
Roberto Sánchez officially announced that he will not recognize the results following the razor-thin June 7 presidential runoff, triggering a severe institutional crisis that significantly threatens the immediate governance and stability of progressive forces in Peru and which had its birth in the effective coup d’etat staged by reactionary forces against former President Castillo in 2022. On December 7, 2022, Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress and establish an emergency government right before an impeachment vote. Castillo was imprisoned.
With 99.72% of ballots processed, right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori (daughter of the former corrupt dictator Alberto Fujimori, 1990-2000) holds a microscopic lead of roughly 40,000 votes. Sánchez has formally denounced the process as “fraudulent” and refused to recognize a Fujimori government. The progressive platform is targeting 400,000 overseas votes—which heavily favored Fujimori—demanding the nullification of 119 consular offices over alleged procedural manipulation. Mobilization escalated into a massive march through Lima, and Sánchez has explicitly called for nationwide protests over the upcoming weekend to reject the tally.
Despite the presidential deadlock, the election formalized a major structural footprint for the left. Sánchez’s Juntos por el Perú party locked in the second-largest block in the newly re-introduced bicameral Congress, securing 32 of 130 seats in the lower house and 14 of 60 seats in the Senate. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular maintains the largest single legislative bloc (41 lower house seats, 22 Senate seats). This ensures that even if Sánchez manages a legal miracle with ballot challenges, a conservative-led legislature retains the numbers to stonewall or quickly impeach progressive leadership.
President Castillo in 2021
The vote cemented a stark geographic divide. Progressive forces proved dominant in the rural and mountainous regions of southern Peru, winning a majority of the country’s actual domestic regional jurisdictions. However, they fell short in the dense urban center of Lima. The left’s momentum is heavily sustained by popular demands for mining sector reforms and resource sovereignty. However, by aligning closely with imprisoned former President Pedro Castillo, progressive forces are easily framed by the conservative establishment as destabilizing elements, pushing the movement into a continuous cycle of street resistance rather than a path to stable executive governance.
In response to the slow, chaotic ballot counting, Sánchez has called for a nationwide “March for Democracy” and is urging social movements and trade unions to defend what his supporters view as an authentic mandate for change.
Progressive efforts are highly disadvantaged by extreme political fragmentation. Since the ouster of former president Pedro Castillo in 2022, right-leaning factions within Congress have solidified power, leading progressive actors to decry rigged electoral systems that purposely dilute their reach.
Progressive candidates have faced extensive pushback from the conservative-dominated legislature, which frequently utilizes constitutional mechanisms—like the “moral incapacity” vote—to remove leftist leadership.
Sánchez’s platform pushed for substantial structural changes, including state-led resource management, the partial nationalization of natural resources, and a popular movement to draft a new constitution. These stances resonate highly among working-class and rural electorates.
While the movement has proven highly capable of rallying large segments of the population frustrated by inequality, its overall chances for governing are repeatedly hamstrung by the ease with which executive powers are impeached by a hostile Congress. Consequently, progressive forces remain in a constant state of defense and protest rather than cohesive governance.
No concrete evidence exists of direct, clandestine U.S. manipulation of election counts in Peru. Similar to the context in Bolivia, accusations of U.S. interference in Peruvian electoral outcomes focus primarily on diplomatic messaging, support for right-wing alignments, and soft-power pressure aimed at countering leftist leaders.
The tight and highly polarized June 7, 2026 presidential runoff between conservative Keiko Fujimori and leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez serves as a prime flashpoint for interference. With the vote count nearly complete, Fujimori maintains a razor-thin lead of roughly 40,000 votes, heavily buoyed by an overwhelming majority of ballots cast by Peruvians living abroad—specifically those residing in the United States.
Left-wing factions and Sánchez supporters have launched mass protests in Lima, claiming “external intervention” and structural bias favoring Fujimori. Sánchez has formally petitioned the National Elections Tribunal (JNE) to annul overseas votes, citing changes to the chain-of-custody procedures for ballots arriving from consular offices in the U.S.. Left-wing critics point to Washington’s regional preference for Fujimori’s pro-market platform as implicit backing for these procedural discrepancies.
The template for recent interference claims was established during Peru’s 2021 election when leftist Pedro Castillo narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori. When Fujimori alleged systematic fraud in 2021 without presenting evidence, the U.S. State Department quickly issued a statement praising Peru’s election as a “model of democracy.” However, left-wing critics allege that behind the scenes, U.S. diplomatic and intelligence entities maintained deep ties with Peru’s conservative military and legislative leadership.
When Castillo was impeached and removed from office in December 2022 after attempting to dissolve Congress, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru immediately recognized his successor, Dina Boluarte. Dina Boluarte won a public election in 2021 as the vice-presidential running mate on the ticket with Pedro Castillo. Prior to that victory, she ran unsuccessfully for the position of mayor of Surquillo (a district in Lima) in 2018. She assumed the presidency in December 2022 by constitutional succession after Pedro Castillo was impeached. She never won a direct, standalone presidential election and served as Peru’s leader until October 2025, when Congress impeached and removed her from office. Leftist allies of Castillo labeled this rapid diplomatic recognition as U.S. endorsement of a legislative coup designed to correct an unfavorable electoral outcome.
The U.S. maintains extensive anti-narcotics and military training aid programs with the Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police. Left-wing critics argue this creates a permanent pro-Washington security apparatus within Peru that acts as an institutional counterweight to any elected left-wing presidency.
Ecuador
Progressive candidates and the Citizens’ Revolution movement have retained strong grassroots support, with figures like former President Rafael Correa maintaining significant influence. However, their prospects are actively hindered by institutional maneuvering; for instance, the temporary suspension of the Citizens’ Revolution party by electoral judges was timed to disrupt local election preparations. Progressive forces generally advocate for social welfare programs, national sovereignty, and restrictions on foreign intervention. This positions them in direct ideological opposition to the right-wing, free-market-oriented administration of President Daniel Noboa.
The U.S. government leverages Ecuador’s severe security crisis and economic vulnerabilities to secure strategic advantages in the region. Facing unprecedented gang violence and drug trafficking, conservative Ecuadorian administrations—most notably President Noboa—have turned to Washington for aid. This has resulted in U.S. SOUTHCOM launching joint military operations and conducting raids against groups classified by the U.S. as “Designated Terrorist Organizations”. Despite Ecuadorian voters explicitly rejecting a November 2025 referendum that would have allowed foreign military bases on their soil, the U.S. has maintained a footprint. Washington has utilized security cooperation agreements and temporary operational deployments to bypass this restriction, securing a foothold for strategic surveillance and intelligence gathering.
Washington uses this security partnership as leverage to counter the growing commercial and diplomatic influence of China in the country. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence infrastructure helps manage cross-border migration and drug networks flowing to the United States.
Chile
Jose Antonio Kast. Like Argentina's Milei, Kast has Trump's blessing. His father is a German immigrant with Nazi roots.
The Chilean progressive and left-leaning movements are currently operating in a challenging landscape. President Kast’s government took office on March 11, 2026, defeating left-wing and communist coalitions by campaigning heavily on anti-crime measures, economic restructuring, and mass deportations. While deep party fragmentation remains across the political spectrum, progressives face a consolidated conservative bloc that is pushing to reduce state spending, lower corporate taxes, and loosen environmental and labor regulations. Despite the current right-wing shift, structural inequalities and social demands—such as housing rights and pension reforms—that fueled the 2019 social uprisings remain largely unresolved. These ongoing grievances serve as the primary ideological foundation for progressive pushes in the coming years.
US influence acts primarily through geostrategic, economic, and security alignment rather than the ideological opposition witnessed in previous decades. The US and Chile continue to deepen security partnerships, which some critics view as a mechanism to secure regional hegemony. For instance, US Southern Command forces are set to participate in combined elite operations—like the PACIFIC DAGGER 2026 exercise—aimed at navigating extreme geographical environments. The US attempts to guide Chilean domestic policy by promoting free-market principles, deregulation, and foreign investment. Historically, this reliance on US capital and multilateral financial institutions has been viewed by leftist critics as a way to restrict the implementation of socialist or heavily redistributive economic policies.
While the nature of US influence has evolved, the historical legacy remains a flashpoint. The US heavily intervened in the 1960s and 1970s—covertly funding anti-communist opposition, funding media propaganda, and orchestrating economic blockades—to topple Marxist President Salvador Allende and support the subsequent right-wing dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The modern relationship has experienced an ideological synchronization under conservative leadership. Under the Trump administration, the US has fostered closer ties with the current President Jose Antonio Kast, gaining a strong strategic partner in Latin America capable of countering opposing left-wing regimes in the region.
Argentina
The United States approaches Argentina through a lens of great-power competition and resource security, utilizing several diplomatic, military, and economic mechanisms to align the country with Washington’s geopolitical objectives. Washington has actively incentivized Argentina to distance itself from China. This includes offering financial lifelines with explicit conditions that Argentina suspend infrastructure projects backed by China and replace Chinese currency swap arrangements with Western alternatives.
As global instability heightens, the U.S. views Argentina as a vital strategic hedge. Argentina possesses enormous reserves of shale oil, shale gas (primarily in the Vaca Muerta basin), and critical minerals like lithium, making it highly valuable to U.S. supply chains and energy independence.
The U.S. successfully pivoted Argentina to a “hyper-West” defense posture. By offering military hardware—such as used F-16 fighter jets and Stryker armored vehicles—and supporting Argentina’s bid for a NATO global partnership, the U.S. integrates the Argentine military firmly into its hemispheric security architecture.
Washington has used its influence with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Treasury to provide financial bailouts and tariff concessions to pro-market Argentine administrations. These maneuvers effectively tie Argentina to Western debt structures and facilitate trade agreements that asymmetrically favor U.S. market access and intellectual property.
The presidency of Javier Milei is the central driving force behind both the current suppression of progressive politics and the rapid acceleration of U.S. alignment in Argentina. President Javier Milei’s administration has fundamentally altered the domestic political landscape, presenting severe challenges to Argentina’s progressive and Peronist coalitions. Milei has implemented aggressive “chainsaw” budget cuts, defunding social programs, freezing public works, and laying off thousands of state employees. This directly targets the economic safety nets traditionally championed by the left. His administration has passed strict anti-protest protocols and criminalized public demonstrations. These measures heavily restrict the street mobilization tactics that progressive unions and social movements historically use to exert political pressure. Milei uses highly polarized rhetoric, labeling progressives and leftists as “parasites” and “enemies of freedom.” This strategy has successfully shifted the public discourse, putting the left on the defensive and fracturing opposition unity.
The U.S. has found an exceptionally eager partner in Milei, who openly embraces a “hyper-Western” foreign policy. This has allowed the U.S. to achieve its strategic goals with minimal resistance. Unlike past conservative presidents who balanced ties, Milei explicitly prioritizes alliances with the U.S. and Israel. He withdrew Argentina from joining the BRICS bloc, directly serving the U.S. goal of isolating China and Russia. Milei has welcomed a heightened U.S. military footprint, including a joint naval base in Ushuaia (Tierra del Fuego). This gives the U.S. military a direct foothold near Antarctica and crucial maritime straits. Through sweeping legislative reforms like the RIGI (Incentive Regime for Large Investments), Milei has lowered taxes and lifted regulations for foreign corporations. This allows U.S. companies to extract Argentina’s lithium, oil, and gas with minimal benefits remaining in the local economy.
Military Alignment
The rapid military alignment between the administrations of Javier Milei and the United States has transitioned from diplomatic rhetoric into concrete operational, structural, and procurement projects. Controlled through U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), these projects primarily target the South Atlantic maritime corridors, Antarctic logistics, and the modernization of Argentina’s forces to Western military standards.
The most geopolitically sensitive project is the development of the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base in Tierra del Fuego. Nominally an Argentine-run project started in 2022 to centralize Antarctic logistics and control regional maritime traffic, Milei pivoted the base to include intensive U.S. integration. Consecutive U.S. SOUTHCOM Commanders—General Laura Richardson and Admiral Alvin Holsey—have personally traveled to Ushuaia to review the project and map out joint collaborations. Opposition politicians strongly criticize the project as a de facto U.S. outpost. The base gives the U.S. a strategic window looking directly into the Drake Passage and the resource-rich Antarctic Peninsula, countering Chinese attempts to build polar research stations in the southern hemisphere.
In May 2026, Argentina’s Ministry of Defense signed a 5-year military cooperation pact with the U.S. to monitor the South Atlantic. The agreement formally authorizes U.S. Southern Command naval and aerial forces to actively participate in patrolling Argentina’s southern exclusive economic zone. The U.S. is providing advanced intelligence, data, and hardware to upgrade Argentina’s maritime surveillance capabilities. The official goal is curbing illegal fishing and regional threats, but the underlying geopolitical objective is neutralizing China’s massive deep-sea fishing fleets and its satellite tracking station in Neuquén.
Bilateral war games have resumed at a scale not seen in nearly two decades. In early 2026, Milei signed a decree authorizing the entry of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the destroyer USS Gridley into Argentine waters. Milei personally boarded the USS Nimitz to oversee complex interoperability drills between the U.S. and Argentine navies.
A highly coordinated, joint-combined exercise has paired elite U.S. Army Green Berets and Air Force Special Operations Command with Argentine special forces. The training explicitly focuses on synchronization in counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and unconventional warfare.
How quickly do Argentine traitors like Milei forget the treacherous role played by the US during the Falklands War.
To pull Argentina out of Russia and China’s defense procurement orbits, the U.S. has facilitated massive hardware transfers to transition Argentina toward NATO-standard operations. The U.S. approved and backed the transfer of 24 Danish F-16 Fighting Falcons to the Argentine Air Force, completely restoring Argentina’s supersonic interception capabilities. The Argentine Army began taking deliveries of U.S.-manufactured Stryker 8x8 Armored Wheeled Combat Vehicles, binding their ground logistics, maintenance, and training loops directly to the U.S. defense apparatus.
In June 2026, the two nations signed bilateral defense agreements allowing the Argentine military to plug into the global U.S. military logistics network for fuel, drone systems access, and supply operations.
Brazil
The Brazilian “left”, spearheaded by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is successfully driving social change but navigating a highly contested political arena. Brazilian President Lula da Silva caused a major political stir during an informal conversation at the G7 Summit when he told IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva that he “was never a leftist”. He described his political stance as being in the “middle ground”. An open microphone caught the Brazilian President in a relaxed, informal dialogue with IMF head Kristalina Georgieva and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Lula explicitly stated, “I was never a leftist,” to which Georgieva reportedly expressed surprise. He further clarified his ideology by stating that the world is heading down the “middle ground”. The comments made international headlines and drew varied reactions back home. While some viewed it as a calculated, pragmatic diplomatic move, others—such as political opposition figures like former General Hamilton Mourão—jokingly suggested his historical party (the Workers’ Party, or PT) should expel him.
While progressive forces have advanced minimum wage increases and expanded conditional cash transfer programs (such as Bolsa Família), they maintain fragile working majorities in the Brazilian Congress. This requires constant negotiation and has occasionally led to key tax reforms being blocked or conservative social/environmental bills advancing.
Progressive institutions and the Brazilian judiciary successfully marginalized the far-right; the Supreme Court convicted former president Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup, removing him from the immediate political game. The conservative and far-right opposition—modeled heavily on right-wing American populism using evangelical support, social conservatism, and anti-corruption discourses—remains a formidable force ahead of the upcoming elections.
The United States uses a multifaceted toolkit to coerce Brazil into aligning with U.S. geopolitical and economic interests, particularly to counter Brazil’s increasing economic and technological integration with China.
The U.S. has weaponized trade by imposing punitive tariffs (such as 50% tariffs on numerous Brazilian products) while selectively exempting certain agricultural goods to control American consumer prices. These economic maneuvers are frequently utilized to pressure the Brazilian government or retaliate against its independent foreign policy.
U.S. interference often extends into the Brazilian justice system. Tactics have included visa revocations targeting Brazilian Supreme Court Justices, financial sanctions under the Magnitsky Act, and alleged historical backing of anti-corruption campaigns (like Operation Lava-Jato) aimed at destabilizing left-wing leadership.
The U.S. has unilaterally designated Brazil’s largest domestic drug gangs (such as the PCC and CV) as foreign terrorist organizations. Because the Brazilian government views this as an infringement on its domestic sovereignty, the designation gives the U.S. extraterritorial powers to apply economic pressure or sanctions against individuals and financial networks within Brazil.
The Brookings Institution suggests that the U.S. must accept Brazil’s strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. In the face of this pressure, Lula’s administration continues to position Brazil as a sovereign middle power, diversifying trade with China while navigating friction with Washington.